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Superstorm Sandy at Five: Lessons on Law as Catalyst and Obstacle to Long-term 
Recovery Following Catastrophic Disasters 
by Donovan Finn and John Travis Marshall  
 
Donovan Finn is an Assistant Professor of Environmental Design, Policy, and Planning in 
the Sustainability Studies Program and School of Marine and Atmospheric Sciences at Stony 
Brook University. He has a Ph.D., 2009, and M.U.P, 2004, from the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign, and a B.A., 2000, from the University of Kansas. John Travis 
Marshall is an Assistant Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. He has 
a J.D., 1997, from the University of Florida College of Law, an M.A., 1994, from the 
University of Texas at Austin, and a B.A., 1990, from the University of Notre Dame. 
 
Hurricane Sandy has often been referred to as a “wake-up call” for the most densely populated 
region of the United States, which includes New York City, coastal New Jersey, and suburban 
Long Island (New York).1  Most would agree that this region is currently thriving. It rebounded 
vigorously from the devastating September 11th terrorist attacks and is home to some of the 
country’s most valuable real estate, iconic cultural landmarks, and productive industries.2 
                                                 
 Authors’ Note: The authors gratefully acknowledge that research for this Article was supported, in part, by funding 
from the National Science Foundation (NSF Award #1335109) and from a summer research grant provided to Dean 
Wendy Hensel and Dean Steven Kaminshine, Georgia State University College of Law. Participants in the 2017 
Vermont Law School Colloquium on Environmental Scholarship provided valuable feedback, including Stephen 
Dycus of Vermont Law School, Ed Richards of Louisiana State University, Amy Hardberger of St. Mary’s 
University Law School, Jane Cohen of the University of Texas, and Bret Wells of the University of Houston Law 
Center. Ann-Margaret Esnard with Georgia State University’s Andrew Young School of Policy Studies provided 
important recommendations for improving this Article. Jeff Thomas, Esq., also shared expert input after reviewing a 
draft of this Article. The authors would also like to thank Max Bowen for his excellent assistance with research and 
editing. 
1 See, e.g., Beth Gardiner, Britain Haunted by Risk of Flooding, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2013 (“Hurricane Sandy was 
a wake-up call around coastal flooding”), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/22/business/energy-
environment/britain-haunted-by-risk-of-flooding.html; DESIGNING FOR FLOOD RISK, infra note 17, at 5.  
2 See Konrad Putzier, NYC vs. the World, REAL DEAL N.Y., Oct. 1, 2015 (discussing New York City’s rising real 
estate prices and their continuing climb that will likely outpace other expensive cities such as London and Hong 
Kong in the near future), https://therealdeal.com/issues_articles/nyc-vs-the-world/; TripAdvisor, Top 25 
Landmarks—United States (as of April 19, 2018, five of the top 10 landmarks in the United States are in New York 
City), https://www.tripadvisor.com/TravelersChoice-Landmarks-cTop-g191 (last visited Apr. 19, 2018); IHS 
GLOBAL INSIGHT, U.S. METRO ECONOMIES (2013) (New York City and northern New Jersey areas have almost 
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However, Sandy exposed the region’s fundamental and ongoing vulnerability to major hazards 
and illustrates how all communities, even those with access to financial and technical resources 
and possessing experience with recovery, can face structural challenges that complicate 
recovery. The storm not only served as a wake-up call about the region’s lack of physical 
protection from extreme events and slow-onset climate change, but also served notice that the 
existing legal infrastructure for recovery3 was, and remains, inadequate.  
Foundational to city resilience are laws and policies.4 These range from federal programs 
that fund recovery projects, to local comprehensive plans and zoning codes, to state 
constitutional provisions and statutes. As post-Sandy rebuilding efforts have illustrated, and as 
major natural disasters preceding Sandy have also proven, the laws and policies that guide 
federal, state, and local government recovery activities can impede—instead of facilitate— 
robust and equitable rebuilding efforts. If, before an event, a community fails to address potential 
deficiencies with the statutes, ordinances, policies, and procedures relevant to recovery, then 
these shortcomings may frustrate recovery from future disasters.  
                                                                                                                                                             
double the gross metropolitan product of the next highest city in the United States), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20150305224230/http://www.usmayors.org/metroeconomies/2013/201311-report.pdf. 
3 We write more than five years after Sandy’s destructive landfall to consider lessons emerging from the New York 
metropolitan region’s long-term recovery. Generally speaking, “recovery” begins as the immediate disaster 
“response” phase ends. Response includes search and rescue and emergency food and shelter provision. The 
“recovery” phase, which follows, includes “timely restoration, strengthening and revitalization of infrastructure, 
housing and a sustainable economy, as well as the health, social, cultural, historic and environmental fabric of 
communities affected by a catastrophic incident.” See FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA), U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GOAL (2d ed. 2015), available at  
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1443799615171-
2aae90be55041740f97e8532fc680d40/National_Preparedness_Goal_2nd_Edition.pdf. See also John Travis 
Marshall et al., Core Capabilities and Capacities of Developer Nonprofits in Postdisaster Community Rebuilding, 
18 NAT. HAZARDS REV. 15016004 (2017) (“Long-term disaster recovery begins when neighborhood rebuilding is 
poised to commence. This is generally about the time homes and vehicles have been cleared from the streets, but 
also when housing, roads, sewers, libraries, and parks remain in ruin.”); Elizabeth Kent, Note, “Where’s the 
Cavalry,” Federal Response to 21st Century Disasters, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 181, 194-95 & n.103 (2006) 
(quoting David McLoughlin, A Framework for Integrated Emergency Management, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 165, 166 
(1985) (recovery includes the “long-term activities that return life to normal”)). 
4 See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., DISASTER LAW AND POLICY 345-64, 369-90 (2d ed. 2010); Anna K. Schwab 
& David J. Brower, Increasing Resilience to Natural Hazards: Obstacles and Opportunities for Local Governments 
Under the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, 38 ELR 10171, 10173-74 (Mar. 2008); Patricia E. Salkin, Sustainability 
at the Edge: The Opportunity and Responsibility of Local Governments to Most Effectively Plan for Natural 
Disaster Mitigation, 38 ELR 10158, 10158 (Mar. 2008); John R. Nolon, Disaster Mitigation Through Land Use 
Strategies, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 959, 963-64 (2006). See also John Travis Marshall, Rating the Cities: 
Constructing a City Resilience Index for Assessing the Effects of State and Local Laws on Long-term Recovery from 
Crisis and Disaster, 90 TUL. L. REV. 35, 36-41 (2015). 
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In response to the lessons learned after Sandy, the region’s local and state governments 
have expended significant effort to update state and local codes and lobby for changes to federal 
policy.5 The federal government has also begun to address some of these issues.6 But the 
challenges are far from resolved. These issues also have important implications well beyond the 
New York and New Jersey region most directly affected by Sandy and offer lessons for sister 
cities of all sizes. The pitfalls that have revealed themselves over the past five years have 
common pathology to the miscues and oversights documented during long-term recovery 
processes that have previously unfolded in other regions of the country. In other words, the same 
types of challenges faced by the New York City region’s residents, businesses, local 
governments, and states may be pertinent to subsequent recoveries including those recently 
commenced in Texas, Florida, and Puerto Rico following the 2017 hurricane season.  
This Article examines the programs that New York City, the state of New York, and the 
state of New Jersey created to help deliver desperately needed federal assistance to residents and 
businesses throughout the region.7 As might be expected of any multibillion-dollar enterprise 
conceived and developed in a matter of just a few months, these programs had flaws and 
shortcomings. Among the challenges the city and the states faced were federal funding sources 
constricted by rigid regulations and local government laws ill-suited to the exigencies of disaster 
recovery. We focus on these law-related obstacles encountered during the post-Sandy disaster 
response and recovery, highlighting ways that state and local governments attempted to work 
within the constraints of existing legal structures to develop locally effective recovery programs. 
                                                 
5 See Samuel Greengard, Eye on the Storm: Engineering a Post-Sandy Recovery, ENGINEERING INC., Sept./Oct. 
2017, at 16 (“Hurricane Sandy forced everyone, including the government and the engineering industry, to 
completely rethink the way infrastructure is built, maintained and upgraded. The policy changes and code changes 
resulting from Sandy will have a hugely positive impact in the years ahead”), 
http://www.dewberry.com/docs/default-source/default-document-library/eye-on-the-storm-engineering-inc-
2017.pdf?sfvrsn=0. 
6 See Sandy Recovery Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 113-2, 127 Stat. 5 (2013). President Obama signed the Sandy 
Recovery Improvement Act into law on January 29, 2013.  
7 A separate important inquiry surrounds the steps that the New York City region has taken – and must take in the 
future – to ensure its resilience to future storms and climate-related challenges. This article does not focus 
specifically on the legal dimensions of New York and New Jersey’s post-Sandy efforts to promote urban resilience. 
There are a range of resources to consult on this critical issue. See, e.g., Sarah Adams-Schoen, Sink or Swim: In 
Search of a Model for Coastal City Climate Resilience, 40 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 433 (2015); Jessica Grannis, Vicki 
Arroyo, et al., Preparing for Climate Impacts: Lessons from the Frontlines (July 2014), available at 
https://kresge.org/sites/default/files/Preparing%20for%20Climate%20Impacts%20-
%20Georgetown%20Climate%20Center.pdf.; Andrea McArdle, Storm Surges, Disaster Planning, and Vulnerable 
Populations at the Urban Periphery: Imagining a Resilient New York After Superstorm Sandy 50 Idaho L. Rev. 19 
(2014).  
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We also identify how certain laws emerged as structural barriers to community recovery 
following Superstorm Sandy.  
The Article proceeds as follows. Section I provides a brief overview of Hurricane Sandy, 
its widespread devastation of New York and New Jersey, and the New York City metro area’s 
distinctive urban form and socioeconomic profile—both characteristics that set the Sandy 
recovery challenge apart from almost every other major U.S. disaster recovery experience. 
Mindful that the U.S. government’s response to Sandy introduced major changes to federal 
disaster response and recovery programs, Section II furnishes a succinct history of federal 
involvement in disaster response and recovery leading up to October 2012. Section III 
specifically outlines the major laws and programs that the federal, state, and local governments 
used to manage the Sandy response and recovery efforts. Despite important refinements and 
improvements to federal laws and programs that followed Hurricane Katrina and the 2008 Iowa 
floods, Hurricane Sandy revealed critical flaws in the federal, state, and local coordination of 
disaster recovery. Section IV details Sandy’s gloss on the several key disaster response and 
recovery programs.  
With the benefit of five years’ hindsight, Section V takes a critical look at the nation’s 
second most expensive disaster recovery. This section demonstrates how disaster recovery can 
be significantly impeded by flawed legal infrastructure through examination of several 
significant challenges to a more equitable and efficient recovery. Section VI concludes by 
considering how Superstorm Sandy’s long-term recovery can inform the deliberations of cities 
nationally regarding the strengths and potential vulnerabilities of their local laws, institutions, 
and capacities for promoting resilient recovery. We suggest six lessons or takeaways to guide not 
only communities affected by Sandy but any community in the United States facing potential 
hazards-related risks, which is to say, everyplace.  
 
I. Hurricane Sandy Brought Unprecedented Destruction to the Singularly 
Distinctive New York Metro Region—An Overview 
Each major natural disaster yields new lessons to share with communities that later find 
themselves in the crosshairs of a catastrophic event. That is because each hazard event brings its 
own unique challenges. It is also because those hazards strike new locations. As a result, there 
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are often significant differences in the physical and legal landscapes of the affected communities. 
Superstorm Sandy is a case in point.  
Sandy’s massive size and destructive force set it apart from most other storms that have 
hit U.S. cities. Its impacts on the New York City region were similarly singular given the 
region’s older and high-density settlement patterns, its orientation to the water, and other special 
characteristics. This section briefly highlights the factors that set Sandy apart and, in so doing, 
have yielded important new lessons not only for other large metropolitan regions but for any 
community that faces the prospect of a future disaster of any kind.  
Hurricane Sandy (later downgraded to Superstorm Sandy) made landfall on the northeast 
coast of the United States on October 29, 2012, first striking land near Atlantic City, New Jersey, 
with 80 mile per hour winds, having already caused severe damage to Jamaica, Cuba, and the 
Bahamas as well as the southern U.S. coast.8 Though the storm had already been downgraded by 
the time of landfall, it was massive. Sandy’s nearly 1,000-mile diameter made it the largest 
Atlantic storm on record while its record-setting low barometric pressure, 940 millibars or 27.76 
inches, meant it was also the most powerful storm to ever make landfall north of Cape Hatteras, 
North Carolina.9 Sandy’s 14-foot storm surge was a result of the storm’s massive size, coupled 
with a full moon and a high tide at the time of landfall, further exacerbated by global sea-level 
rise.10 
Sandy struck an enormous region. In all, 24 states were affected in some way by the 
storm, but by far the most concentrated impact was on the New York City metropolitan region, 
including New York City, the entire state of New Jersey, and New York state’s suburban Long 
Island counties of Nassau and Suffolk, located just east of New York City.11 This metro region 
contains the nation’s largest and densest city but also small coastal communities and sprawling 
                                                 
8 See Tim Sharp, Superstorm Sandy: Facts About the Frankenstorm, LIVE SCI., Nov. 27, 2012, 
https://www.livescience.com/24380-hurricane-sandy-status-data.html. 
9 See Mark Fischetti, Sandy Versus Katrina, and Irene: Monster Hurricanes by the Numbers, SCI. AM., Oct. 29, 
2012, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/sandy-vs-katrina-and-irene/; Alan Duke, Superstorm Sandy 
Breaks Records, CNN, Oct. 31, 2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/30/us/sandy-records/index.html. 
10 See Bob Henson, Dissecting Sandy’s Surge, ATMOSNEWS, Dec. 31, 2012 (examining factors that caused the 
extreme storm surge associated with Superstorm Sandy, and what could have exacerbated the surge), 
https://www2.ucar.edu/atmosnews/perspective/8585/dissecting-sandy-s-surge.  
11 See FEMA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, HURRICANE SANDY FEMA AFTER-ACTION REPORT 1 
(2013), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1923-25045-7442/sandy_fema_aar.pdf. 
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suburban regions spread across two states and over two dozen counties and hundreds of 
municipalities.  
The storm forced the practically unprecedented multiday shutdowns of the New York 
City transit system, the New York Stock Exchange, and the New York City school system.12 
Extensive coastal and inland flooding destroyed thousands of homes and damaged thousands 
more, and 8.5 million customers lost power during the storm.13 At least 162 deaths were 
ultimately attributed to the storm in the United States alone.14 The region’s infrastructure was 
also severely impacted, including flooding of multiple rail tunnels under the Hudson and East 
Rivers, New Jersey’s Hoboken Terminal rail station, and the runways at LaGuardia Airport. 
Overall, Sandy was the second most economically damaging hurricane in U.S. history after the 
$147.2 billion (adjusted to 2013 dollars) losses caused by Katrina. Sandy’s price tag totaled $68 
billion worth of losses in the United States, including $30 billion in New Jersey and $33 billion 
in New York state.15 
The New York metro region’s distinctive social and urban development profiles created 
special disaster response and recovery challenges. While the metro region includes buildings of 
every type, it contains a much higher percentage of multiunit buildings and party-wall structures 
than most other places in the United States.16 Additional challenges relate to the overall land use 
patterns of the region, which include a much more fine-grained mix of uses than is typical in 
                                                 
12 See id. (reviewing FEMA’s response to Hurricane Sandy, noting areas of strength during disaster recovery, and 
discussing areas of improvement for future disaster response efforts). 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 See AON BENFIELD, HURRICANE SANDY EVENT RECAP REPORT 19, 21, 38 (2013) (the $68 billion figure does not 
include non-U.S. economic losses in the amount of $4 billion between the Caribbean, Bahamas, and Canada), 
http://thoughtleadership.aonbenfield.com/Documents/20130514_if_hurricane_sandy_event_recap.pdf.  
16 See NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, COASTAL CLIMATE RESILIENCY: RETROFITTING 
BUILDINGS FOR FLOOD RISK (2014) [hereinafter RETROFITTING BUILDINGS FOR FLOOD RISK] 15-21, available at 
https:// https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/plans-studies/retrofitting-
buildings/retrofitting_complete.pdf; see also U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder, Physical Housing 
Characteristics for Occupied Housing Units: 2012-2016 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates (showing 
that single-family detached structures account for 62.8% of all occupied residences in the United States as a whole, 
but only 9.4% of New York City residences), 
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_16_5YR_S2504&prodType
=table (last visited Apr. 19, 2018). 
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many other regions.17 These complexities are well known among recovery and planning officials 
in the region.  
New York City’s Department of City Planning has enumerated these challenges in 
multiple reports, guidebooks, and advisory documents, such as Designing for Flood Risk, 
Retrofitting Buildings for Flood Risk, and Resilient Retail.18 As part of its remit, the Mayor’s 
Office of Recovery and Resiliency continues to advocate for reform of these federal policies to 
make them more reactive to on-the-ground situations in New York City and elsewhere. Other 
municipalities in the region, such as Hoboken, New Jersey, have faced similar issues and have 
also created resources to help property owners navigate the complexities of rebuilding and 
mitigation in dense urban environments such as the city of Hoboken’s Cross-reference Guide to 
Post-Sandy Resiliency Planning and Engineering and Resilient Building Design Guidelines.19  
Another recovery challenge in the New York metro region is the cost of housing vis-à-vis 
national averages. While federal relief funding caps do not vary by geography, costs do, and the 
New York region’s construction costs are significantly higher than anywhere else in the world.20 
Housing costs, not surprisingly, are also high. In New York City and the 11 coastal New York 
and New Jersey counties most affected by Sandy, the median value of owner-occupied housing 
units ranged from 1.26 to 2.77 times the national median of $178,600.21 Gross rent is also 
                                                 
17 See ULI FOUNDATION, AFTER SANDY: ADVANCING STRATEGIES FOR LONG-TERM RESILIENCE AND ADAPTABILITY 
4 (2013), http://americas.uli.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/125/ULI-Documents/AfterSandy.pdf.  
18 See NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CITY PLANNING, COASTAL CLIMATE RESILIENCE: DESIGNING FOR FLOOD 
RISK (2013) [hereinafter DESIGNING FOR FLOOD RISK], 
http://www.sustainablenyct.org/news/NYCDCP_DESIGNING%20FOR%20FLOOD%20RISK_ 
DRAFT-LOW.pdf; RETROFITTING BUILDINGS FOR FLOOD RISK, supra note 16; NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF 
CITY PLANNING, COASTAL CLIMATE RESILIENCY: RESILIENT RETAIL (2016) [hereinafter RESILIENT RETAIL], 
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/plans-studies/resilient-retail/resilient-retail-full-report-2-
pager.pdf.  
19 See CITY OF HOBOKEN, NEW JERSEY, CROSS-REFERENCE GUIDE TO POST-SANDY RESILIENCY PLANNING AND 
ENGINEERING (2015) (copy on file with the authors); PRINCETON HYDRO, RESILIENT BUILDING DESIGN GUIDELINES 
(2015), http://www.hobokennj.gov/docs/communitydev/Resilient-Buildings-Design-Guidelines. 
20 See TURNER & TOWNSEND, INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION MARKET SURVEY 2017, at 16-20, 84-85 (2017) (as of 
2017, New York City’s construction costs have become the highest in the world, New York City has the second 
highest cost of labor, and both of these costs are expected to continue their rise), 
http://www.turnerandtownsend.com/media/2412/international-construction-market-survey-2017-final.pdf; compare 
to Kathryn Brenzel, High Construction Wages, Material Costs, Make NYC the World’s Most Expensive to Build: 
Report, REAL DEAL N.Y., May 17, 2017, https://therealdeal.com/2017/05/17/high-construction-wages-material-
costs-make-nyc-the-worlds-most-expensive-place-to-build-report/.  
21 See U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder, Selected Housing Characteristics: 2011-2015 American 
Community Survey 5-Year Estimates, 
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universally higher in the region than the national median, from 1.12 times higher in Cape May 
County, New Jersey, to 1.35 times in New York City, and fully 1.7 times higher in Nassau 







New York Metro Region Cost of Housing* 
 
Geography 
Median value of 
owner-occupied 
housing 2011-















United States 178,600 — 928 — 
New York City 494,800 +277% 1,255 +135% 
Bergen County, NJ 441,100 +247% 1,348 +145% 
Hudson County, NJ 335,300 +188% 1,214 +131% 
Middlesex County, NJ 323,300 +181% 1,299 +140% 
Monmouth County, NJ 385,100 +216% 1,238 +133% 
Ocean County, NJ 262,700 +147% 1,322 +142% 
Essex County, NJ 356,600 +200% 1,068 +115% 
Union County, NJ 345,500 +193% 1,174 +127% 
Atlantic County, NJ 225,600 +126% 1,047 +113% 
Cape May County, NJ 299,700 +168% 1,038 +112% 
Suffolk County, NY  375,100 +210% 1,544 +166% 
                                                                                                                                                             
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_15_5YR_DP04&prodType
=table (last visited Apr. 19, 2018). 
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Nassau County, NY  446,400 +250% 1,578 +170% 
* U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder, Selected Housing Characteristics: 2011-2015 American Community 
Survey 5-Year Estimates, 
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_15_5YR_DP04&prodType






These steep housing costs hinder rebuilding and recovery because in many cases the cost 
to replace existing homes, not to mention adding upgraded mitigation measures, is substantially 
greater than the aid amounts available.22 Consider that National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) 
coverage is capped at $250,000 for residential structures and $500,000 for commercial 
structures.23 While in many parts of the country that will pay to replace an entire home, in the 
Sandy region it is often inadequate. Similarly, the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 
(FEMA’s) housing assistance (HA) aid through the Individuals and Households Program (IHP) 
is intended to cover temporary housing costs during the post-disaster repair period, repair 
damage to a primary residence, or help with the cost of replacing a primary residence. Benefits 
are adjusted annually based on the U.S. Department of Labor Consumer Price Index, currently 
capped at $34,000 as of October 1, 2017.24 But this amount provides much more purchasing 
power in some parts of the country than others, as housing values in the Sandy region illustrate.  
The federal Small Business Administration (SBA) also makes disaster recovery and post-
disaster mitigation loans to eligible businesses, homeowners, and renters.25 Again, due to the 
high labor and real estate costs in the Sandy region, federal maximums were often inadequate to 
                                                 
22 See Russ Zimmer, Out of Money? Four Options for Stuck Sandy Families, APP.COM, Aug. 20, 2015, 
https://www.app.com/story/news/local/monmouth-county/sandy-recovery/2015/08/20/sandy-rehab-loans-home-
construction/32044899/.  
23 See HelpWithMyBank.gov, Answers About Flood Insurance, https://www.helpwithmybank.gov/get-
answers/insurance/flood-insurance/faq-flood-insurance-18.html (last updated Sept. 2017). 
24 See Notice of Maximum Amount of Assistance Under the Individuals and Households Program, 82 Fed. Reg. 
47568 (Oct. 1, 2017). 
25 See SBA, SBA DISASTER LOAN PROGRAM FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2017), 
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/articles/sba-disaster-loans-faq.pdf. 
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address recovery needs.26 Low-income renters and senior citizens were also overrepresented in 
the populations of Sandy-affected areas, and more than 1,800 owners in the inundation area in 
New York City alone were already in the mortgage foreclosure process before Sandy. These 
vulnerable households thus faced additional recovery pressures, including a lack of discretionary 
income available to finance recovery and inability to find new affordable housing options in the 
region’s expensive and constrained housing market.27 
In New York City in particular, temporary housing constraints were even more 
pronounced. Though 64.2% of the city’s 3,400,093 housing units are rentals, the city’s 2014 
Housing and Vacancy Survey found a citywide rental vacancy rate of just 3.45%, and had 
reported even fewer vacancies (3.12%) in its 2011 survey.28 These numbers are far below the 
national vacancy average, which was 11.4% in 2010.29 Only 16.5% of city residents live in 
single-family homes.30 Most residents are apartment dwellers, and have little if any extra space 
to house displaced friends or relatives for any significant amount of time. The city also has few 
locations in which to site temporary housing (e.g., FEMA trailers).31 These factors combined to 
make it extremely challenging, but absolutely essential, to develop innovative ways to get 
residents back in their own homes as quickly as possible.  
II. A Brief History of Federal Disaster Recovery Law and Policy Leading Up to 
Hurricane Sandy  
Federal involvement in response to specific disaster events extends almost as far back as the 
nation’s founding. More recent, however, is the federal government’s role in creating programs 
that could be deployed nationwide to support local response and recovery efforts. The evolution 
of these federal programs has progressed piecemeal, generally tracking the particular response 
                                                 
26 See Brenzel, supra note 20. 
27 See FURMAN CENTER FOR REAL ESTATE AND URBAN POLICY, SANDY’S EFFECTS ON HOUSING IN NEW YORK CITY 
(2013), available at http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/SandysEffectsOnHousingInNYC.pdf. 
28 See ELYZABETH GAUMER & SHEREE WEST, NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND PRESERVATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT, SELECTED INITIAL FINDINGS OF THE 2014 NEW YORK CITY HOUSING AND VACANCY SURVEY 1-2, 11 
(2015), http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdf/2014-HVS-initial-Findings.pdf.   
29 See U.S. Census Bureau, American FactFinder, General Housing Characteristics: 2010 Census Summary File, 
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=DEC_10_SF1_QTH1&prodType
=table (last visited Apr. 19, 2018). 
30 U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 16. 
31 See Cindy Rodriguez, FEMA Says No to Trailers in New York City, WNYC, Dec. 6, 2012, 
https://www.wnyc.org/story/255683-no-fema-trailers-new-york-city/. 
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and recovery challenges presented by successive natural disasters. To understand notable gaps in 
federal recovery programs in place when Superstorm Sandy hit the region in October 2012, it is 
important to appreciate the challenges associated with the federal government’s effort to build a 
set of comprehensive disaster recovery programs.  
The story of federal disaster policy begins not long after the nation’s founding. In late 
1802, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, suffered a series of fires known as the Great Portsmouth 
Parade Fire. One hundred thirty-two buildings burned, devastating the city. Because of the 
importance of the busy port and related shipbuilding industry, the fledgling U.S. Congress passed 
the first federal disaster aid bill on January 14, 1803, a Bill for the Relief of Sufferers of Fire in 
the Town of Portsmouth, authorizing the city to cancel all of its old bonds and issue new bonds 
to finance rebuilding. Over the next 147 years, Congress followed a practice of largely ad hoc 
response, passing 128 more bills to facilitate local disaster recovery after specific events.32  
The first concerted attempt to systematize the federal role in recovery did not come until the 
Disaster Relief Act of 1950, which established some of the basic concepts that inform federal 
disaster response to this day.33  
Many other components of today’s federal recovery infrastructure also date to the 1950s 
and 1960s. Under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Small Business Act of 1953 created the 
SBA, building on earlier precedents including the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the 
U.S. Department of Commerce’s Office of Small Business.34 In addition to assisting small 
businesses in normal times, the SBA also provided recovery loans to disaster-impacted 
businesses and homeowners and continues to be an important recovery resource today.35 The 
1964 Amendments to the Alaska Omnibus Act36 authorized the federal Housing and Home 
Finance Agency administrator to provide up to $25,000,000 in direct grant funding for urban 
renewal projects to help local communities rebuild after Alaska’s March 1964 “Good Friday” 
earthquake. The Alaska Act established the precedent for using direct block grant programs for 
                                                 
32 See REBECCA KATZ, ESSENTIALS OF PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS 47-48 (1st ed. 2013). 
33 See Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-875, 64 Stat. 1109-11. 
34 See Pub. L. No. 83-163, 67 Stat. 230 (1953). 
35 See Keith Bea, The Formative Years: 1950-1978, in EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
1900-2010, at 81, 87 (Claire B. Rubin ed., Routledge 2012). 
36 See Pub. L. No. 88-451, 78 Stat. 505 (1964). 
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disaster relief that would later evolve into the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s 
(HUD’s) Community Development Block Grant Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) Program.  
Another pillar of modern federal disaster policy emerged in 1968 with the creation of the 
NFIP, a critical piece of the country’s flood-related mitigation and recovery framework.37 The 
NFIP was created through the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, though it was 40 years in 
the making.38 The private insurance industry ceased covering flood losses after the Great 
Mississippi River Flood of 1927.39 President Harry S. Truman later advocated for a national 
flood insurance program after the Great Flood of 1951 caused extensive losses in Kansas and 
Truman’s native Missouri. Truman’s successor, President Eisenhower, eventually oversaw 
passage of the Federal Flood Insurance Act of 1956, which included federal flood insurance, 
reinsurance, and disaster loan programs.40 The impacts of Hurricane Betsy in 1965, and previous 
storms in the southern United States in 1963 and 1964, finally prompted the federal government 
to create and fund the NFIP through Title XIII of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 
1968.41 
The destruction caused by Hurricane Camille and 28 other major disasters that occurred 
in 1969 led to increased federal spending on disaster relief and recovery.42 This prompted 
President Richard Nixon to issue the April 22, 1970, Special Message to Congress on Federal 
Disaster Assistance. This Message advocated a more aggressive federal approach to all aspects 
                                                 
37 See FEDERAL INSURANCE AND MITIGATION ADMINISTRATION, FEMA, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 
FACT SHEET (2016) [hereinafter NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM FACT SHEET], 
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1464700430600-c4b174ccadfea6b6a121acaeb06097a6/National-Flood-
Insurance-Program-Fact-Sheet-May-2016r.pdf. 
38 See Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (1968); AMERICAN INSTITUTES FOR RESEARCH ET AL., A CHRONOLOGY OF 
MAJOR EVENTS AFFECTING THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 3-12 (2002) (detailing how various flood 
control measures, and the government’s support of them, evolved from 1917 until the founding of the NFIP in 
1968), available at https:// https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1602-20490-
7283/nfip_eval_chronology.pdf  
39 See AMERICAN INSTITUTES FOR RESEARCH ET AL., supra note 38, at 3. 
40 See Pub. L. No. 84-1016, 70 Stat. 1078 (1956). 
41 See Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 476 (1986). The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 established the NFIP and 
Federal Insurance Administration, both then housed within HUD to provide federal flood insurance to property 
owners in communities where local governments undertake voluntary flood mitigation and enact floodplain 
management ordinances.  
42 See David Moss, Courting Disaster? The Transformation of Federal Disaster Policy Since 1803, in THE 
FINANCING OF CATASTROPHE RISK 307, 317 (Kenneth A. Froot ed., University of Chicago Press 1999). 
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of disaster management.43 In response, Congress passed the 1970 Disaster Relief Act and 
amendments in 1974. The Act attempted to unify the disparate existing federal disaster-related 
programs. It added a new emphasis on assistance for individuals, thus continuing a policy shift 
away from long-standing expectations that neighbors and philanthropies were responsible for 
household-level relief, loosened restrictions on the repair of municipal facilities, and further 
emphasized funding of mitigation as a federal priority.44  
Together, passage of the National Flood Insurance Act and the 1970 Disaster Relief Act 
and its 1974 amendments created a more integrated—though still not completely streamlined—
federal disaster recovery system. President Nixon continued to promote this integrated approach 
through Presidential Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973, which eliminated the Presidential Office 
of Emergency Preparedness and consolidated federal disaster relief and recovery efforts in the 
newly created Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA) within HUD.45 Five years 
later, FEMA was created by President Jimmy Carter via Presidential Reorganization Plan No. 3 
of 1978 and implemented through Executive Order Nos. 12127 and 12148 in an attempt to 
consolidate disaster-related functions in one agency.46 Previously, these responsibilities had been 
divided among a broad range of federal entities, including the Defense Civil Preparedness 
Agency, the U.S. Department of Defense, the FDAA, HUD, the Department of Commerce, the 
Federal Preparedness Agency, the General Services Administration, and the Office of Science 
and Technology Policy.  
In 2002, FEMA ceased to be an independent federal agency and was integrated into the 
newly formed U.S. Department of Homeland Security.47 The role of FEMA and other federal 
agencies related to disaster mitigation, response, and recovery is currently defined by the 1998 
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act.48 The Stafford Act mandates 
that federal assistance supplement local and state efforts once exhausted, and it requires states 
                                                 
43 See President’s Special Message to Congress on Federal Disaster Assistance, 1 PUB. PAPERS 379-84 (Apr. 22, 
1970). 
44 See Moss, supra note 42, at 317, 331; Disaster Relief Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-606, 84 Stat. 1744; Disaster 
Relief Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143. 
45 See Presidential Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973, 38 Fed. Reg. 1089 (July 1, 1973).  
46 See Presidential Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978, 43 Fed. Reg. 41943; Exec. Order No. 12127, 44 Fed. Reg. 
19367 (Mar. 31, 1979); Exec. Order No. 12148, 44 Fed. Reg. 43239 (July 20, 1979). 
47 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.  
48 See Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§5121-5207.  
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(through their governors) to explicitly request federal assistance for response and recovery.49 The 
Act also places a heavy emphasis on coordination, and it illustrates the most aggressive 
government role to date in promoting pre-disaster planning and mitigation, in addition to post-
event relief and recovery.  
In the several years leading up to Superstorm Sandy, a string of major disasters hit 
communities from the Gulf Coast to the Midwest to the Northeast. These events, which included 
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma in 2005, Hurricanes Gustav and Ike and the Iowa floods in 
2008, and then Tropical Storm Irene in 2011, focused intense criticism on the federal 
government’s coordination and leadership of recovery efforts. The Post-Katrina Emergency 
Management Reform Act amended the Stafford Act in 2006, requiring the creation of a National 
Disaster Recovery Strategy and National Disaster Housing Strategy to further delineate the 
disaster recovery responsibilities of federal agencies.50  
In 2011, less than a year before Sandy, the federal government issued its National 
Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF), a new blueprint for more efficient and streamlined 
disaster recoveries.51 The NDRF represented the federal government’s effort to improve local, 
state, and federal coordination along the entire continuum of planning and response, from pre-
disaster planning to the short-term, mid-term, and long-term recovery periods following a 
disaster.52 It urges governments to begin preparing for a disaster event long before the event 
occurs by envisioning what the city or county would like recovery to look like. These 
preparations include anticipating possible post-disaster stressors, such as a local government’s 
lack of staff and its ability to coordinate with nongovernmental organizations to achieve long-
term recovery goals.53  
                                                 
49 Id. §5170. 
50 See 6 U.S.C. §§771-772; Robert B. Olshansky & Laurie A. Johnson, The Evolution of the Federal Role in 
Supporting Community Recovery After U.S. Disasters 80 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 293, 299 (2015). 
51 See FEMA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL DISASTER RECOVERY FRAMEWORK (2011) 
[hereinafter NDRF], https://www.fema.gov/pdf/recoveryframework/ndrf.pdf. Because the first edition of the NDRF 
was in place both during Sandy and the immediate aftermath, it is referenced here rather than the second edition that 
was released in 2016. The current version of the NDRF is available at https://www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/1466014998123-4bec8550930f774269e0c5968b120ba2/National_Disaster_Recovery_Framework2nd.pdf. 
52 See NDRF, supra note 51, at 8. 
53 Id. at 13-17. 
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The passage of the NDRF also means that federal, state, tribal, and local governments, as 
well as business and nongovernmental organizations, understand that they each have particular 
spheres of responsibility in helping communities recover.54 Finalized more than a year before 
Sandy, the NDRF’s observation concerning the vulnerability of urban centers is prescient. But 
the NDRF’s discussion of a densely settled urban community’s vulnerability amounts to a brief 
paragraph.55 It does not flag the types of challenges local governments may encounter in carrying 
out major disaster response and recovery in a densely settled urban setting.  
As this history illustrates, decisions about the structure of the nation’s disaster response 
and recovery programs have been informed by lessons learned from each previous disaster, 
involving constant and ongoing refinements. At the same time, the system is a product of politics 
and ongoing debates about the role the federal government should play in helping communities 
mitigate disaster risk and/or recover from disasters. Moreover, responsibilities for various 
aspects of recovery continue to be spread across multiple federal agencies and distributed among 
municipalities, states, and the federal government. This situation is neither inherently good nor 
bad, but it does mean that the nation’s approach to disaster response and recovery is, and will 
remain, complex and constantly evolving. The lessons provided by Sandy provide yet another 
opportunity to further refine federal, state, and local recovery policies.  
 
III. Current Federal Tools for Disaster Mitigation and Recovery 
The preceding history of federal involvement in disaster recovery reveals the complex genealogy 
and orphan provenance of federal recovery efforts. This history also helps explain how so many 
different federal agencies have come to be involved in recovery, ranging from FEMA and HUD 
                                                 
54 See id. at 19-24. The NDRF prescribes specific leadership positions that it expects local, state, and tribal 
organizations to fill prior to disaster events and then serve as critical points of contact for carrying out disaster 
response programming. Id. at 25-35. These local, state, and tribal leadership positions do not displace existing local, 
state, and tribal leadership positions, but are meant to encourage complementing them with qualified professionals 
and ensure that there are local and state coordinating officers to work with the federal disaster recovery coordinator. 
Id. at 25, 34. 
55 Despite all of the attention to pre-event planning, coordination, and evaluation, it is important to highlight that 
completing an assessment of existing laws and policies related to recovery received only general treatment in the 
NDRF’s initial iteration. The NDRF version in circulation in October 2012 advised local governments to review 
existing planning documents, but its pre-disaster planning guidelines did not specifically suggest a broader need to 
look at local or state laws relating to housing and community development. These laws might include building 
codes, code enforcement ordinances, or zoning codes. The NDRF did, however, specifically note that densely settled 
urban communities deserve special consideration in disaster planning because they are especially at risk to problems 
surrounding disaster response and recovery. 
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to the SBA and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps), and it illustrates, in part, why the 
recovery process is so dauntingly complicated.  
This section describes the array of federal programs that were in place when the state of 
New Jersey, the state of New York, and New York City began to rebuild following Superstorm 
Sandy. As this description makes evident, state and local governments faced an enormous 
challenge in deploying direct response aid in the days after the storm. At the same time that New 
Jersey, New York, and New York City were supplying immediate life-saving assistance, they 
were also already beginning to design and staff multibillion-dollar long-term recovery delivery 
systems that could effectively interface with federal programs. Simultaneously, they were 
crafting new relationships with key federal agencies and learning how to navigate the 
complicated requirements of several relatively distinct federal programs. The challenges facing 
individuals were perhaps just as great. State and local governments and affected families and 
businesses learned quickly that their path to recovery would involve a long and difficult process 
of “wading through federal alphabet soup,” as described by Holly Leicht,56 who was regional 
administrator for HUD’s Region II at the time of Sandy. 
The federal government’s current role in long-term recovery is largely financial and 
legal. While the federal government provides significant technical assistance, it is the state and 
local governments that decide how recovery and rebuilding will occur, using a significant 
amount of federal money and working within the parameters established by Congress and federal 
agencies.57 This section outlines the sources of funding that figure critically in state and local 
government recovery choices. First, we examine FEMA’s post-disaster assistance, hazard 
mitigation, and insurance programs, then we describe the SBA post-disaster loan program and 
conclude with a review of HUD’s long-term disaster recovery and resilience programs.  
 
A. FEMA’s Post-disaster Assistance Programs 
Following a presidentially declared major disaster, FEMA wears at least three hats: furnishing 
individual recovery assistance to affected homeowners, providing public assistance to local and 
state governments to rebuild public facilities and infrastructure, and making available a tranche 
                                                 
56 See HOLLY M. LEICHT, REBUILD THE PLANE NOW: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING GOVERNMENT’S 
APPROACH TO DISASTER RECOVERY AND PREPAREDNESS 4 (2017), http://communityp.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/07/IMPROVING-DISASTER-RECOVERY-PAPER-FINAL.pdf. 
57 See 42 U.S.C. §5195. 
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of hazard mitigation funds to disaster-affected state and federally recognized tribal governments. 
FEMA uses four programs to carry out its responsibilities. 
 
1. FEMA’s IHP 
FEMA’s IHP assists residents whose primary residence has been affected by a disaster.58 The 
amount of assistance is limited and adjusted annually (currently $33,000). The IHP is designed to 
be a relief mechanism of last resort. FEMA expects those with minor housing damage, short-
term shelter needs, and/or financial or other resources such as insurance to address their own 
needs without IHP assistance. The program is intended to address serious and immediate needs 
for shelter and related needs, but not to reconstruct homes to a pre-event condition. An applicant 
must be a U.S. citizen, legal permanent resident, or qualified alien.  
 
2. FEMA’s Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) 
A post-disaster landscape usually yields strong clues regarding the changes communities should 
consider making to avoid future injuries, deaths, and repetitive losses. Choosing to rebuild a city 
in a manner resilient to floods, earthquakes, or tidal surges is expensive and often beyond the 
reach of local governments. Federal assistance is critical to help pay for the costs of elevating 
structures, strengthening them to seismic stressors, or buying out homeowners living in the most 
vulnerable locations. FEMA’s HMGP59 provides funding specifically devoted to helping 
communities and their residents build back in a manner that prevents future loss of life and 
                                                 
58 IHP financial housing assistance is directly provided to affected residents to fund housing-related needs such as 
securing temporary housing or repairing critical components of a primary residence in order to make it habitable. 
Direct housing assistance is also available when affected residents are unable to use financial assistance, such as 
when there is no available short-term or long-term rental housing available.  
59 It is important to note that the HMGP is not the only FEMA hazard mitigation program nor is FEMA the only 
federal agency that funds hazard mitigation projects. Under its post-disaster Public Assistance Program, FEMA 
supports hazard mitigation in rebuilding projects associated with public assistance investments, such as 
improvements that make a local government’s buildings resistant to flooding. This public-sector infrastructure 
mitigation project is authorized by §406 of the Stafford Act. See Hearing Before the House Subcommittee on 
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications of the Committee on Homeland Security, 114th Cong. 15 
(2016) (testimony of Michael Byrne, Deputy Regional Administrator, Region II, FEMA). HUD has also authorized 
local and state governments to use CDBG-DR funds for hazard mitigation purposes, such as HUD’s $900 million 
post-Sandy investment in flood mitigation projects in both New York and New Jersey. See Hearing Before the 
House Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications of the Committee on Homeland 
Security, 114th Cong. 20 (2016) (testimony of Marion Mollegen McFadden, Deputy Assistant Secretary, HUD). 
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property when the hazard recurs.60 FEMA reviews state HMGP applications looking for projects 
that fulfill a range of criteria.61 The project must save lives and property well into the future 
when the community is threatened by similar hazards.62 If FEMA funds the proposed project, the 
state must supply 25% of the project’s funding. The states then make the awarded funds 
available to subapplicants—the homeowners, local governments, and nonprofits working in the 
disaster area. 
New York and New Jersey deployed their allocations of HMGP funds both to assist 
individuals and to pay for improvements to public infrastructure potentially vulnerable to future 
flooding events. New York’s Bridge Scour Program focused on upgrades to more than 100 
bridges in 78 different local jurisdictions.63 The state’s remaining HMGP money was allocated to 
projects aimed at making infrastructure more resilient to natural hazards as well as to restoring 
natural landscapes that could play an important role in protecting communities from future 
flooding events.64 New Jersey devoted a significant portion of its HMGP dollars to helping 
homeowners elevate their homes65 or sell their homes for use as greenspace to help mitigate 
future losses due to flooding.66  
 
3. FEMA’s NFIP 
Administered by FEMA, the NFIP is typically thought of as a source of financial assistance to 
homeowners affected by floodwaters, providing federally backed and subsidized flood insurance. 
In actuality, the program has a second rationale, which is to reduce the overall exposure to flood-
                                                 
60 See FEMA, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program, https://www.fema.gov/hazard-mitigation-grant-program (last 
updated June 8, 2017). 
61 Id. (Benefits of HMPG). 
62 Id.  
63 See GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF STORM RECOVERY, NY RISING: 2012-2015 at 16 (2015) (reviewing housing, small 
business, community, and infrastructure recovery projects funded by the New York Governor’s Office in the wake 
of Hurricane Sandy), https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/GOSRreport102915.pdf. 
64 Id. at 14-18. 
65 See News Release, State of New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, Christie Administration 
Announces Approval of First Sandy Elevation Grants From Department of Environmental Protection’s HMGP 
Elevation Program (Apr. 4, 2014) (New Jersey committed $100 million in HMGP funds to help homeowners elevate 
their homes), http://www.nj.gov/dep/newsrel/2014/14_0023.htm. 
66 See NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, SUPERSTORM SANDY BLUE ACRES BUYOUT 
PROGRAM—FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (2015), http://www.nj.gov/dep/greenacres/pdf/faqs-blueacres.pdf.  
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related risks by facilitating effective floodplain management.67 A third component of the NFIP is 
floodplain mapping and risk assessment.68 We focus here only on the post-disaster assistance 
portion of the program, but other aspects of the NFIP will be discussed in subsequent sections.  
To be eligible for NFIP coverage, a residential property owner, renter, or business owner 
must be located in one of the more than 22,000 jurisdictions that participate in the NFIP.69 
Participating communities are required to implement FEMA-approved floodplain management 
ordinances aimed at reducing the risk of flooding.70 Flood insurance is optional for residents and 
business owners in both high- and low-risk areas of a participating community, though it is 
mandatory for structures located in high-risk zones (special flood hazard areas, or SFHAs) that 
currently carry a mortgage or other loan from a federally insured lender or the SBA.71 Failure to 
maintain this mandatory coverage can also preclude a property owner from receiving additional 
SBA loans.72 In 2016, there were more than 5.1 million existing NFIP policies totaling more than 
$1.25 trillion in coverage, while paid claims averaged more than $31,000.73 
 
4. FEMA Public Assistance (PA) Program 
FEMA’s PA Program provides funds for states, municipalities, tribal governments, and some 
nonprofit organizations providing essential services, like medical care, education, or utility 
supply, to cover short-term response and long-term recovery from presidentially declared 
                                                 
67 See DIANE P. HORN & JARED T. BROWN, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, INTRODUCTION TO THE NATIONAL 
FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM (NFIP) 2 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R44593.pdf.  
68 See FEMA, National Flood Insurance Program: Flood Hazard Mapping, https://www.fema.gov/national-flood-
insurance-program-flood-hazard-mapping (last updated Apr. 16, 2018). 
69 See FEMA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, FLOOD INSURANCE 101: TALKING POINTS FOR 
COMMUNITY OFFICIALS (2012), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1427808495979-
1d43a43f7ed24e65171793481bcfc79e/Flood_Insurance_101_TPs_03_2015.pdf. 
70 See FEMA, Participation in the National Flood Insurance Program (communities are required to have flood 
management ordinances that meet or exceed NFIP criteria), https://www.fema.gov/participation-national-flood-
insurance-program (last updated Dec. 13, 2017). 
71 See FEDERAL INSURANCE AND MITIGATION ADMINISTRATION, FEMA—NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: 
A HOMEBUYERS’ GUIDE (2016), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1464695739574-
7e3648887255b0d9fa98767d8406115e/NFIP-Fact-Sheet-A-Home-Buyers-Guide-May-2016r.pdf. 
72 See News Release, FEMA, Flood Insurance: Good Financial Sense Now Affects Disaster Assistance Later (Jan. 3, 
2018), https://www.fema.gov/pt-br/node/326758. 
73 See NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM FACT SHEET, supra note 37. 
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disasters.74 PA funds can be used for emergency work, such as debris removal, as well as 
emergency protective measures like demolition of damaged structures. In addition, they can 
provide temporary community facilities.75 Permanent work eligible for PA funding can include 
construction of infrastructure and facilities such as roads, bridges, utilities, parks, and public 
buildings.76  
 
5. SBA Disaster Loan Program 
SBA loan programs are designed to help residents and businesses recover by providing funding 
to assist with uninsured losses. The SBA Disaster Loan Program has three components. Home 
disaster loans are available to homeowners to repair or replace real estate damaged by a disaster 
up to a maximum of $200,000.77 Homeowners and residential renters may borrow up to $40,000 
to replace lost or damaged personal property such as home contents and automobiles.78 Business 
physical disaster loans are available in amounts not to exceed $2,000,000 to help businesses 
(including nonprofits, churches, and private universities) repair or replace property such as 
buildings, supplies, and equipment.79 Economic injury disaster loans are loans of last resort to 
help small businesses meet financial obligations that result from a disaster.80 Mitigation loans 
may also be available to fund efforts that will protect against damage from future events.81  
SBA loans come with many stipulations. Second homes and property such as recreational 
vehicles and pleasure boats are ineligible, items such as antiques are valued only at their 
functional value, and exterior components of homes (e.g., swimming pools or decorative 
                                                 
74 See FEMA, Public Assistance: Local, State, Tribal, and Private Non-profit, https://www.fema.gov/public-
assistance-local-state-tribal-and-non-profit (last updated Sept. 14, 2017). 
75 Id. 
76 See FEMA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FACT SHEET (2017), 
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1497559657642-
a01f6ee60e25394fa9a25cae2fd289d5/PublicAssistanceFactSheetJune2017.pdf. 




81 Id. at 4. 
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landscaping) are eligible for only limited coverage.82 SBA loans may also be used to refinance 
home and business mortgages or to pay for relocation, subject to SBA guidelines.83  
 
6. HUD’s CDBG-DR 
Along with FEMA and SBA funds, HUD’s CDBG-DR funding constitutes one of the three 
major sources of federal disaster recovery funding.84 CDBG-DR grant funds have become an 
increasingly important source of funds to help fuel affected communities’ major post-disaster 
long-term recovery projects, with Congress and HUD having used CDBG-DR to help fund 
recovery from 18 different disasters before Sandy, totaling $31,887,000,000 in aid.85 By law, 
70% of a state’s or city’s CDBG-DR award must benefit low- and moderate-income families.86 
HUD defines low-income as individuals and families earning less than 80% of the area median 
income.87 For example, in 2017, this would mean that post-disaster CDBG-DR funds are targeted 
to the needs of a New York City family of four earning $76,320 or less.88 Despite these 
constraints, CDBG-DR is generally considered the most flexible source of funding for disaster 
recovery projects89 in contrast to FEMA and SBA sources.  
CDBG-DR allocations funded a range of state and local programs. New York state and 
New Jersey used these funds to create state-run programs to help Sandy-impacted homeowners 
                                                 
82 See id. at 3. 
83 See SBA, U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION DISASTER LOANS—FACT SHEET, 
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/Concord%20Disaster%20Loan%20Fact%20Sheets.pdf. 
84 See EUGENE BOYD, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT FUNDS IN 
DISASTER RELIEF AND RECOVERY 1 (2011), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33330.pdf. 
85 See Kevin F. Gotham, Reinforcing Inequalities: The Impact of the CDBG Program on Post-Katrina Rebuilding, 
24 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 192 (2014). 
86 See BOYD, supra note 84. 
87 See OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH, HUD, FY 2017 HUD INCOME LIMITS BRIEFING MATERIAL 
1 (2017) (“Area Median Income is calculated annually by HUD for each urbanized area in the country based on date 
from the Census Bureau’s American Community Survey”), available at 
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/il//il17/IncomeLimitsBriefingMaterial-FY17.pdf. 
88 See NYC Housing Preservation & Development, Affordable Housing—Area Median Income (AMI), 
http://www1.nyc.gov/site/hpd/renters/what-is-affordable-housing.page (last visited Apr. 19, 2018). 
89 See, e.g., Texas Rebuilds, The Long-term Road to Recovery, http://www.texasrebuilds.org/Pages/AboutCDBG-
DR.aspx (last visited Apr. 19, 2018); Jenny Hsu, What to Know About the CDBG Disaster Recovery Program, 
NAHRO BLOG, Oct. 5, 2017, https://nahroblog.org/2017/10/05/what-to-know-about-the-cdbg-disaster-recovery-
program/; Marion M. McFadden, Senate Includes Long-term Recovery Funds in Hurricane Aid Package, 
ENTERPRISE COMMUNITY PARTNERS, Sept. 7, 2017, https://www.enterprise 
community.org/blog/2017/09/senate-includes-long-term-recovery-funds-hurricane-aid-package. 
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rebuild their homes.90 New York state earmarked CDBG-DR funds to “buy out” homeowners 
living in vulnerable locations near the water.91 New Jersey used CDBG-DR funds to pay for 
housing, economic development programs, and infrastructure restoration. New York City used 
its $4.21 billion in CDBG-DR funds to address infrastructure, housing restoration, and housing 
and economic revitalization.92  
Over six decades, in response to a variety of disasters in varied contexts, the federal 
government assembled this suite of FEMA, SBA, and HUD programs as the core of its recovery 
assistance strategy. These programs have been the principal funding source for the Sandy 
region’s major programs for response to, and recovery from, the storm’s devastation. As detailed 
in Section IV, these federal programs have supported state and local implementation of 
initiatives tailored to the needs of local communities.  
 
IV. The Superstorm Sandy Recovery and the State and City Implementation of Federal 
Disaster Recovery Programs  
Disasters on the scale of Sandy are rare. But they are not without precedent. In the past 25 years, 
Hurricane Andrew, the Northridge earthquake, Hurricane Katrina, and the 2008 Iowa floods had major 
impacts on midsize and large U.S. cities. In the summer of 2017, Hurricane Harvey drowned Houston and 
Hurricane Maria shredded San Juan’s buildings and infrastructure. However, rarely has a disaster 
devastated a region as densely settled as New York, with its particular mix of sociodemographic 
characteristics, land use patterns, building types, forms of home ownership, cost of living, and other 
complicating factors.93  It became clear relatively quickly in many parts of New Jersey, New York state, 
and New York City that federal recovery programs designed to respond to prior disasters were not 
                                                 
90 See ReNew Jersey Stronger, Sandy Recovery Program Information, 
http://www.renewjerseystronger.org/transparency/sandy-recovery-program-information/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2018); 
NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF COMMUNITY RENEWAL, STATE OF NEW YORK ACTION PLAN FOR COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT PROGRAM DISASTER RECOVERY 1-2 (2013), 
http://www.nyshcr.org/Publications/CDBGActionPlan.pdf. 
91 See PROSOURCE TECHNOLOGIES, LLC &AKRF, INC., TIER 1 ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW RECORD COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT—DISASTER RECOVERY PROGRAM NY RISING HOUSING RECOVERY PROGRAM: 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR 5+ UNIT RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES NASSAU COUNTY, NY 196-98 (2014), 
https://stormrecovery.ny.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/MFH_Nassau_NEPA_EA_Amended.pdf. 
92 See Memorandum From Kimberly Greene, Regional Inspector General for Audit, HUD, to Stanley A. Gimont, 
Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Grant Programs, HUD 4 (Dec. 21, 2016) (Audit Report No. 2017-NY-1004). 
93 See Julia Zeveloff, This Is the Most Densely Packed City in the US, BUSINESS INSIDER, available at 
http://www.businessinsider.com/most-densely-populated-place-in-america-2012-3 (reporting the New York-Newark 
area as the fifth most densely settled urban region in the U.S. with 5,319 per square mile and the nation’s most 
populous with 18.3 million residents); see also RETROFITTING BUILDINGS FOR FLOOD RISK, supra note 16, at 16. 
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calibrated for the realities of much of the Sandy region. To address the federal recovery programs’ poor 
fit, state and local governments acted quickly to create a number of programs designed specifically to deal 
with local contexts, using the existing, though sometimes limited, flexibility built into federal programs to 
tailor recovery strategies to the needs of local communities.  
 
A. The New York City Rapid Repairs and Build It Back Programs 
New York City crafted two ambitious housing recovery programs to address the immediate and 
longer-term housing repair and rebuilding needs created by Sandy. The Interim Assistance Rapid 
Repairs Program (Rapid Repairs) was the city’s attempt to fill storm-impacted residents’ 
desperate need for housing in the weeks immediately following the storm.94 The city’s Build It 
Back Program aided homeowners who needed to engage in a range of recovery activities from 
repair, to rebuilding, to sale of their storm-damaged home to the government.95 Each program 
was remarkable in its scope and reach, aiding tens of thousands of New York City residents.96 
But the programs were novel and created under intense time pressure. As a result, program 
rollouts encountered problems. City residents and regulators alike criticized both programs for 
shortcomings in design and implementation.  
In Sandy’s immediate wake, thousands of New York City residents were left with 
damaged homes that, even if structurally sound, lacked power, heat, or hot water. Aware that 
freezing temperatures were possible at any time during the late fall and winter months of 2012 
and 2013, the city moved immediately to protect citizens by repairing these essential home 
systems.97 Identifying quick, safe, and cost-effective post-disaster housing has long been a 
                                                 
94 See Memorandum From Kimberly Greene, supra note 92, at 4; NYC Build It Back, Rapid Repairs, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/recovery/html/resources/rapid.shtml (last visited Apr. 19, 2018). 
95 See Mayor Bloomberg Announces NYC Build It Back Program to Help New Yorkers With Homes Damaged by 
Hurricane Sandy Recovery and Rebuild (June 3, 2013), available at  http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-
mayor/news/185-13/mayor-bloomberg-nyc-build-it-back-program-help-new-yorkers-homes-damaged-by.  
96 See, e.g., id. (Rapid Repairs assisted more than 20,000 individuals); MAYOR’S OFFICE OF HOUSING RECOVERY 
OPERATIONS, NYC BUILD IT BACK: STRONGER & SAFER—COMPLETING THE BUILD IT BACK PROGRAM (Oct. 2017), 
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/recovery/downloads/pdf/october_2017_build_it_back_progress_update.pdf 
(noting that the Build It Back Program had served more than 8300 homeowners); Russ Buettner & David W. Chen, 
Hurricane Sandy Recovery Program in New York City Was Mired by Its Design, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2014, 
https://www.nytimes. 
com/2014/09/05/nyregion/after-hurricane-sandy-a-rebuilding-program-is-hindered-by-its-own-construction.html. 
97 See NYC BUILD IT BACK, Rapid Repairs, available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/recovery/html/resources/rapid.shtml. 
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vexing challenge for local and state governments.98 In prior disasters, state and local 
governments have often received FEMA trailers to house affected residents.99 No such solution 
would work in New York City where there are few large lots on which to house multiple trailers 
and, for individual families, little or no yard space on which to park a single trailer.100 A tight 
rental market and other factors (as discussed in Section I) created additional challenges. 
Given the urgency of approaching winter weather and these specific local constraints, the 
city was compelled to develop its own locally tailored short-term housing program quickly. 
Rapid Repairs was a modified application of FEMA’s post-Sandy Sheltering and Temporary 
Essential Power Pilot Program designed to assist residents with restoring essential housing 
components such as windows, doors, and utilities. The program allowed residents to remain in 
their homes during long-term reconstruction and thereby reduced the need for off-site shelters 
and temporary housing.101 In a departure from precedents established after previous disasters, the 
city retained large construction contractors directly, deploying them on applicants’ behalf. 
Between November 2012 and the end of March 2013, the program repaired 11,800 structures, 
which included a total of 20,000 housing units.102 As result, thousands of individuals and 
families were able to quickly return to or stay in their homes. These families were also remaining 
much closer to their jobs, schools, churches, and other important community resources, thus 
contributing to family and overall community recovery. FEMA’s PA Grant Program paid for 
90% of the Rapid Repairs Program’s $97 million price tag.103 The remaining 10% of the program 
costs were covered by HUD CDBG-DR funds.104  
Rapid Repairs’ highly innovative approach was not without criticism. Contractors 
retained by the city to perform emergency repairs noted that they waited months for final 
                                                 
98 See Build Abroad, Post Disaster Housing: Contrasts Between Urban and Rural Relief, 
https://buildabroad.org/2016/09/09/post-disaster-housing/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2018).  
99 See, e.g., Bill Barrow, FEMA to Close Renaissance Village Trailer Site May 31, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 24, 2009, 
http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2008/04/fema_to_close_renaissance_vill.html.  
100 See Rodriguez, supra note 31. 
101 See Gilbane Building Co., New York City Department of Environmental Protection Rapid Repairs STEP 
Program, https://www.gilbaneco.com/project/new-york-city-department-environmental-protection-rapid-repairs-
step-program/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2018). 
102 See Memorandum From Kimberly Greene, supra note 92, at 4. 
103 See News Release, FEMA, Public Assistance: By the Numbers (June 20, 2013), https://www.fema.gov/news-
release/2013/06/20/public-assistance-numbers. 
104 See Memorandum From Kimberly Greene, supra note 92, at 4. 
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payment, meaning that private firms effectively helped finance the public program.105 HUD’s 
inspector general criticized the city for careless program administration decisions, including the 
city’s erroneous payment of $18.2 million in state sales tax on program-related repairs and 
services, even though the city was supposedly exempt from such taxes.106 Further, some 
homeowners complained of poor work, including electricians that left exposed wires and hot 
water heaters and boilers that were improperly installed.107 
Rapid Repairs was an emergency effort to stabilize damaged properties, but not all 
necessary repairs could be completed in the first several months following the storm.108 The 
city’s Build It Back Program was designed to support the second stage of recovery, which 
included more substantial rehabilitation or reconstruction of homes and residential rental 
buildings as well as support for very low-income renters.109 Once again, New York City did not 
have a reliable template for this program. Just as the federal government had a frustrating pre-
Sandy track record for carrying out emergency disaster recovery programs, state and local 
governments have historically experienced significant challenges designing and administering 
long-term housing recovery programs.110  
New York City was determined to avoid that fate. It designed Build It Back specifically 
to overcome the post-Katrina legacy of contractors who performed shoddy work, contractors 
who defrauded homeowners, and homeowners who spent their rebuilding funds to pay for 
                                                 
105 See Esther D’Amico, Lesson Learned From a Superstorm, ENR N.Y., May 31, 2013, 
http://www.enr.com/articles/11722-lessons-learned-from-a-superstorm.  
106 See Memorandum From Kimberly Greene, supra note 92, at 2. 
107 See, e.g., Tom Wrobleski, Staten Islanders Playing Rapid Repairs Roulette, SILIVE.COM, Feb. 11, 2013, 
http://www.silive.com/news/index.ssf/2013/02/staten_islanders_playing_rapid.html; Tara Palmeri, Homeowners 
Blast Shoddy Repairs by Contractors Through FEMA’s Rapid Repairs Program, N.Y. POST, Jan. 28, 2013, 
http://nypost.com/2013/01/28/homeowners-blast-shoddy-repairs-by-contractors-through-femas-rapid-repairs-
program/. 
108 See, e.g., Buettner & Chen, supra note 96. 
109 See WILLIAM GOLDSTEIN ET AL., ONE CITY, REBUILDING TOGETHER 7 (2014), 
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/home/downloads/pdf/reports/2014/sandy_041714.pdf. 
110 See, e.g., Mark G. Welsh & Ann-Margaret Esnard, Closing Gaps in Local Housing Recovery Planning for 
Disadvantaged Displaced Households, 11 CITYSCAPE: J. POL’Y DEV. & RES. 195-212 (2009) (examining how 
hurricanes in Broward County, Florida, displaced many disadvantaged households without having adequate pre- and 
post-disaster planning in place to assist those families), 
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/cityscpe/vol11num3/ch9.pdf; Timothy F. Green & Robert B. Olshansky, 
Rebuilding Housing in New Orleans: The Road Home Program After the Hurricane Katrina Disaster, 22 HOUSING 
POL’Y DEBATE 75, 95-96 (2012). 
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expenses completely unrelated to rebuilding.111 Sandy-impacted property owners had the option 
of using city-approved contractors or selecting their own contractor. Though reimbursement was 
also available for smaller repairs, Build It Back was designed to make payments directly to 
contractors for the most significant repairs as well as resiliency efforts such as housing 
elevation.112  
Funded by federal CDBG-DR grant monies appropriated as part of the January 2013 
Sandy Recovery Improvement Act, Build It Back ultimately established three strategies for 
revitalizing storm-impacted neighborhoods. Those strategies included a program to aid single-
family homeowners who owned residences with up to four units; a multifamily property 
rebuilding program for structures supporting five or more housing units; and a comparatively 
small rental assistance program for very low-income renters.113 The single-family program for 
buildings with one to four units initially offered those owners three options: repair, repair with 
elevation of the damaged structure, or rebuild.114 In 2014, the program added two more options 
for single-family program participants: reimbursement for participants’ storm repairs completed 
prior to their enrollment in Build It Back and, in limited instances, a government buyout of the 
storm-damaged property, which would allow the homeowner to relocate.115 As of October 2017, 
Build It Back had served 8,207 properties containing more than 12,500 housing units, with 7,217 
projects already completed.116  
The design of Build It Back was significantly influenced by HUD regulations specifying 
the income of individuals that the federal government prioritized for post-disaster aid. Strict 
federal guidelines required that CDBG-DR grant funds primarily benefit low- and moderate-
income families.117 Under applicable HUD CDBG regulations, this meant that the Build It Back 
Program was required to spend at least 50% of its funding on families earning 80% or less of the 
                                                 
111 See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 109, at 9.  
112 See MAYOR’S OFFICE OF HOUSING RECOVERY OPERATIONS, NYC BUILD IT BACK STRONGER & SAFER: 
COMPLETING THE BUILD IT BACK PROGRAM 1-2 (2017), 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/recovery/downloads/pdf/october_2017_build_it_back_progress_update.pdf. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 10. 
115 Id. at 11. 
116 See id. at 1-2. 
117 See BOYD, supra note 84.  
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New York City area median income, which in April 2014 was a family of four earning $68,700 
annually.118  
Creating and managing a post-storm redevelopment program that manages repairs for 
thousands of private homeowners is an enormous undertaking, unprecedented for any private 
developer, much less for a public entity, such as a city. Initially budgeted in 2013 for $1.45 
billion, by 2016, the Build It Back Program’s obligations had surged more than 33% over 
budget.119 The program also suffered from lengthy delays in beginning work on storm-damaged 
homes, with no work having been commenced by December 2013, more than 14 months after 
Sandy.120  
The city cited a range of reasons for its major delays and cost overrides, including 
program design and implementation. Federal requirements governing expenditure of CDBG-DR 
grant funds necessitated that many homeowner applicants navigate multiple rounds of income 
verification, damage inspections, and assurances that Build It Back Program funds were not 
duplicating home rehabilitation benefits already covered by SBA disaster loans or FEMA-funded 
repair programs.121 Recalibrating program implementation to fully accommodate these federal 
requirements meant that just a few months after rolling out Build It Back, the city changed 
program requirements and required completion of new forms, thus causing significant confusion 
amongst homeowners.122  
Local regulatory requirements also impeded implementation. Build It Back required that 
homeowners work with the city’s Department of Buildings to close all “open” permits for work 
they commenced before—sometimes years before—the proposed Build It Back Program rehab 
work.123 Further, as detailed below in Section VI, if the homeowners’ post-storm repair work 
required a home’s significant reconfiguration on small, narrow city lots, the proposed work often 
triggered local zoning code provisions that necessitated variances to allow minor 
                                                 
118 See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 109, at 11. By 2017, this amount had increased to $76,320, see NYC Housing 
Preservation & Development, supra note 88.  
119 See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 109, at 17. 
120 Jen Kirby, The City’s “Build It Back” Program to Repair Sandy-Damaged Homes Will Miss Its Deadline, N.Y. 
MAG., Oct. 20, 2016, http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/10/city-wont-meet-sandy-build-it-back-program-
deadline.html. 
121 See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 109, at 12. 
122 Id. at 9, 12-13. 
123 See id. at 13. 
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nonconformities with the strict requirements of the city’s zoning code.124 These local zoning 
approvals demanded homeowners navigate a time-consuming public process while otherwise 
overseeing reconstruction of the storm-damaged home. To complicate matters, the city’s initial 
design of the program overlooked the potential value of coordinating program implementation 
directly with neighborhood-based community groups.125 This meant that Build It Back Program 
administrators faced the challenge of implementing a program without neighborhood-based case 
managers who could coordinate communication with residents regarding program changes and 
delays. 
Now in the fifth year of post-storm recovery, progress toward the program’s goals of 
rebuilding homes and communities has accelerated. At the end of May 2017, the city reported 
that it had completed repairs on almost three-fourths of homes enrolled in the program.126 But in 
some neighborhoods, such as Breezy Point in Queens, repair work had been completed on fewer 
than half of the 425 homes enrolled.127 Homeowner attrition has also been significant. Between 
May 2016 and May 2017, the program saw 466 homeowners drop out, equal to 13% of the total 
homeowners who remained in the program as of May 2016.128 
 
B. New York’s and New Jersey’s State-level Recovery Programs 
While New York City received a direct allocation of CDBG-DR funding from the federal 
government and used those funds to pay for long-term recovery initiatives such as Build It Back 
and other programs, the states of New York and New Jersey used their own CDBG-DR 
allocations to craft programs tailored to the needs of each state and consistent with the respective 
governors’ approaches and attitudes toward the state role in recovery. New York Governor 
Andrew Cuomo established the Governor’s Office of Storm Recovery (GOSR) in June 2013 to 
oversee recovery efforts from Sandy as well as the previous year’s Hurricane Irene and Tropical 
                                                 
124 Id. at 14. 
125 Id. at 9. 
126 See Jillian Jorgensen, NYC’s Build It Back Makes Progress in Fixing Homes Damaged by Hurricane Sandy, but 
Many Quit the Program, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 7, 2017, http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/build-back-sees-
progress-fixing-homes-damaged-sandy-article-1.3227130. 
127 See Aaron Zebrook, Living in Breezy Point, Queens, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/slideshow/2017/05/24/realestate/living-in-breezy-point-queens/s/28LIVING-BREEZY-
POINT-slide-JZBM.html.  
128 See Jorgensen, supra note 126. 
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Storm Lee, which together affected 38 of the state’s 62 counties.129 GOSR, also sometimes 
referred to as “NY Rising,” was funded primarily with $4.4 billion in CDBG-DR funds and 
focused on four program areas, mainly, though not exclusively, targeting areas outside New 
York City: housing recovery, small business recovery, community reconstruction, and 
infrastructure.  
GOSR’s housing recovery programs included repair, mitigation, and buyout programs, as 
well as targeted assistance for multifamily rental property owners, cooperatives, and 
condominiums in addition to the state’s buyout and acquisition programs.130 The Interim 
Mortgage Assistance Program was also created, to assist homeowners with mortgage payments 
and rental housing costs if state-funded repairs, mitigation, and elevation projects forced them to 
vacate their homes temporarily.131 Small businesses were eligible for grants of $50,000 to 
$250,000, loans of up to $1 million, and mentoring assistance.132 The NY Rising Community 
Reconstruction Program funded community-based recovery and resilience plans created through 
a state-mandated participatory process with technical assistance provided by the New York State 
Department of State and private planning consultants.133 The 124 participating communities 
including municipalities, counties, and 16 New York City neighborhoods also received more 
than $700 million in cumulative grants to jumpstart implementation of the plans.134 Additionally, 
infrastructure programs included grants to municipalities for use as a nonfederal match for 
FEMA PA grant applications, $383 million to fund sewer repair and improvement in Suffolk 
County, and projects like beach stabilization efforts at Robert Moses State Park on Long 
Island.135  
                                                 
129 See GOSR, About, https://stormrecovery.ny.gov/about (last visited Apr. 19, 2018). 
130 Id.  
131 See GOSR, NY RISING INTERIM MORTGAGE ASSISTANCE (IMA) PROGRAM FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 
(2017), 
https://stormrecovery.ny.gov/sites/default/files/crp/community/documents/20170822_IMA_FAQ_FINAL_0.pdf. 
132 See GOSR, Small Business Recovery Program (The second question in the FAQs section at the bottom of the 
page addresses these assistance amounts.), https://stormrecovery.ny.gov/business/small-business-recovery-program 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2018).  
133 See GOSR, Community Reconstruction Program, https://stormrecovery.ny.gov/community-reconstruction-
program (last visited Apr. 19, 2018).  
134 Id. 
135 See Laura Figueroa, Cuomo Announces $383M for Suffolk Sewer Projects, $97M for Bay Park in Nassau, 
NEWSDAY, Oct. 29, 2014, https://www.newsday.com/long-island/cuomo-announces-funding-for-li-water-sewer-
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New Jersey Governor Chris Christie, similarly, used the flexibility of his state’s $4.2 
billion in CDBG-DR funding to develop locally appropriate responses under the umbrella of 
ReNew Jersey Stronger, coordinated by the Governor’s Office of Recovery and Rebuilding.136 
The state developed more than two dozen distinct programs focusing primarily on homeowners, 
rental housing, economic revitalization, infrastructure, and local governments. The 
Reconstruction, Rehabilitation, Elevation, and Mitigation Program, for instance, focused on 
primary residences.137 Another program, the Low-to-Moderate Income Homeowners Rebuilding 
Program, provided an additional pool of $50 million focused on lower income property owners, 
with special consideration for owners of substantially damaged manufactured homes.138 The 
Superstorm Sandy Blue Acres Program allocated $300 million to buy approximately 1,300 
Sandy-affected or flood-prone properties.139  
New Jersey’s Resettlement Program awarded $10,000 grants to owners of damaged 
properties to remain in their existing home or buy a new home in the same county, while the 
Sandy Homebuyer Assistance Program provided $50,000 forgivable interest-free loans to buyers 
purchasing primary residences in any of the nine New Jersey counties most affected by Sandy.140 
New Jersey renters and landlords were also eligible to apply for a host of programs including the 
Tenant-based Rental Assistance Program, the Landlord Incentive Program, the Landlord Rental 
Repair Program, the Fund for Restoration of Multifamily Housing, and the Predevelopment Fund 
                                                                                                                                                             
projects-1.9555915; GOSR, NEW YORK RISING: 2012-2014, at 32, 
https://stormrecovery.ny.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/gosr_report_letter_full_high.pdf. 
136 See ReNew Jersey Stronger, Sandy Recovery Program Dashboard, 
http://www.renewjerseystronger.org/transparency/sandy-recovery-program-dashboard/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2018).  
137 See ReNew Jersey Stronger, About the Reconstruction, Rehabilitation, Elevation, and Mitigation (RREM) 
Program, http://www.renewjerseystronger.org/homeowners /rrem/about-the-rrem-program/ (last visited Apr. 19, 
2018).  
138 See ReNew Jersey Stronger, LMI Homeowners Rebuilding Program, 
http://www.renewjerseystronger.org/homeowners/lmi-homeowners-rebuilding-program/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2018).  
139 See ReNew Jersey Stronger, Blue Acres Buyout Program, 
http://www.renewjerseystronger.org/homeowners/blue-acres-buyout-program/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2018).  
140 See ReNew Jersey Stronger, Resettlement, http://www.renewjerseystronger.org/homeowners/resettlement/ (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2018); ReNew Jersey Stronger, Sandy Homebuyer Assistance Program, 
http://www.renewjerseystronger.org/homeowners/sandy-homebuyer-assistance-program/ (last visited Apr. 19, 
2018).  
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for Affordable Rental Housing, which focused primarily on rebuilding and enhancing the state’s 
supply of affordable rental property.141 
New Jersey’s business recovery programs included the Stronger NJ Business Grant 
Program, providing grants or forgivable loans of up to $50,000 to rebuild Sandy-damaged 
businesses, and the Stronger NJ Business Loan Program, providing low-interest recovery loans 
capped at $5 million.142 Local government grants were available through the Post-Sandy 
Planning Assistance Grant Program designed to help municipalities develop or update 
community plans such as master plans, hazard mitigation plans, and others.143 The Essential 
Services Grant and Zoning Code Enforcement Grant Program were both designed to help 
communities address the increased workload and associated personnel costs and simultaneous 
revenue losses that Sandy created, while the Unsafe Structures Demolition Program, Flood 
Hazard Risk Reduction Program, Neighborhood and Community Revitalization Program, and 
Neighborhood Enhancement Program also made CDBG-DR funds available to municipalities to 
address various community-scale recovery, rebuilding, and resilience issues.144  
As the New York City, New York state, and New Jersey programs show, the inherent 
flexibility of CDBG-DR funding has been an important component of local recovery, with 
grantees using CDBG-DR funds to develop suites of programs addressing a range of recovery 
issues that are uniquely responsive to local conditions. CDBG-DR funds, like the CDBG 
program generally, “stand out as among the most flexible” sources of recovery aid available.145 
But there are downsides inherent in this dynamic as well. First, CDBG-DR’s flexibility is 
relative. It only points to the rigidity and limitations of most other federal recovery programs, 
which often constrain the utility and effectiveness of those programs for affected residents, 
                                                 
141 See ReNew Jersey Stronger, Renters (each of the programs discussed in this sentence are found in the sidebar, 
including descriptions of the program and the benefits provided to the covered groups), 
http://www.renewjerseystronger.org/renters/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2018). 
142 See BRETT THEODOS ET AL., URBAN INSTITUTE, TAKING STOCK OF THE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK 
GRANT 8 (2017), https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/89551/cdbg_brief_finalized.pdf. 
143 See ReNew Jersey Stronger, Post-Sandy Planning Assistance Grant Program, 
http://www.renewjerseystronger.org/communities/post-sandy-planning-assistance-grant-program/ (last visited Apr. 
19, 2018).  
144 See ReNew Jersey Stronger, Communities (each of the programs discussed is included in the Communities 
sidebar and is discussed in more detail), http://www.renewjerseystronger.org/communities/ (last visited Apr. 19, 
2018). 
145 See THEODOS ET AL., supra note 142, at 8. 
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thereby placing significant strain on CDBG-DR to make up for the deficiencies and limitations 
of other federal programs.  
Second, state and local programs funded by CDBG-DR must be created from the ground 
up after a disaster. Thus, they demand a high degree of capacity and expertise on the part of the 
governments that receive the CDBG-DR funds. This issue was somewhat muted after Sandy, 
given the significant amount of expertise available in the region related to issues like disaster 
recovery, urban planning, and finance, but this expertise is not always in ready supply in other 
parts of the country. Additionally, CDBG-DR funds are not delivered to the states (or New York 
City) instantaneously and programs cannot be created overnight. As a result, there is a built-in 
time lag during which time affected residents, businesses, and communities must rely only on 
existing limited federal programs or local funds, if available.  
Finally, state and local programs, though well intentioned and designed to work 
effectively in local contexts, must be created quickly and without time for testing and refinement. 
The New York City Build It Back Program has been a sobering example of how an innovative 
and well-intentioned program may nonetheless prove largely unworkable or inefficient, but that 
knowledge has come far too late to help thousands of homeowners who placed their faith in the 
program only to be left unserved for years. 
The Sandy experience illustrates that it is not realistic to expect that local governments 
can use the flexibility of CDBG-DR funding to fully overcome shortcomings of federal recovery 
programs. Even in a region with significant recovery resources, local and state governments 
faced significant challenges. However, as discussed in Section V, implementation of federal 
programs has also encountered obstacles. These obstacles are due not only to implementing 
regulations at odds with the New York City region’s development pattern, but also due to the 
pervasive challenge presented by the different land development standards imposed by local 
governments.  
 
V.  Flawed Law and Policy Impaired a More Efficient and Equitable Response and 
Recovery: Highlighting Sandy Recovery Challenges by Sector 
Laws play an important role in facilitating and impeding community recovery. The preceding 
section describes how state and local governments harnessed federal funding, specifically federal 
community development block grant monies, to create their own recovery programs. These 
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recovery programs took advantage of CDBG-DR’s more flexible legal requirements to create 
programs attuned to local needs and conditions. But not all laws encountered in the Sandy long-
term recovery proved as flexible or accommodating.  
Unfortunately, New York City and the states of New Jersey and New York were forced 
to roll out their recovery programs in a legal landscape containing significant obstacles to 
efficient and equitable community recovery. Superstorm Sandy demonstrated that disaster 
recovery can be significantly impeded by well-intentioned but flawed legal infrastructure.146 
These flaws manifest themselves when a jurisdiction lacks laws and policies that facilitate 
resilient recovery.147 These flaws are also revealed when a jurisdiction’s existing laws prove too 
rigid and ill-suited for achieving positive recovery outcomes. The consequences are significant. 
The absence of critical laws or policies may leave a community without a legal tool or “gear” 
that might otherwise leverage optimal response and recovery results. Further, a law that 
hinders—or even renders unlawful—the recovery interventions that might be most helpful to 
individuals, businesses, or neighborhoods effectively denies the full measure of relief to affected 
communities.  
A necessary step to devising more effective disaster recovery programs is to develop an 
increasingly nuanced appreciation for how a disaster’s context makes particular demands on the 
legal and policy landscape. A catastrophic coastal storm that devastates a densely settled 
metropolitan area requires a legal and institutional tool chest somewhat different from the one 
that serves a midwestern community decimated by a tornado or a sprawling southern city’s 
recovery from a hurricane. Thus, some of the hard-earned lessons flowing from the Sandy 
recovery will be most applicable to recovery from future disasters in dense urban places and 
some may indeed be unique to the New York region. Yet, many of Sandy’s long-term recovery 
lessons will have broad reach and application. Lessons flowing from Sandy can help illuminate 
the general types of challenges that other communities may face, even if specific local conditions 
are very different.  
This section provides detailed snapshots of four legal infrastructure deficiencies revealed 
by Sandy. These examples are representative of the array of legal challenges communities face, 
                                                 
146 See Gerald Frug, Rebuilding After Disasters Is Largely a Legal Challenge, CITYLAB, Oct. 18, 2013, 
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2013/10/why-rebuilding-after-disasters-largely-legal-challenge/7248/.  
147 Id. Frug notes that recovery is frequently impeded by a failure of integration between federal, state, and local 
governments that allows for an effective recovery. 
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but they are not exhaustive. They are taken from federal, state, and local laws and policies, and 
focus primarily on the recovery of residences and businesses, including physical recovery (i.e., 
rebuilding and mitigation) and, in the case of businesses, operational recovery. These examples 
are particularly illustrative in that they show how existing legal frameworks can hinder effective 
recovery. The first example illustrates how, after Sandy, federal disaster recovery programs 
proved a poor fit for densely settled urban neighborhoods and the types of buildings that 
constitute them. The second example shows how forms of property ownership common in the 
Sandy region created barriers to effective household recovery for many residents. The third 
example addresses the roadblocks to business recovery inherent in existing policies. The fourth 
and final example highlights how even a community’s own zoning code can be an impediment to 
smooth and rapid recovery.  
 
A. Recovering and Rebuilding Damaged Structures in Urban Neighborhoods 
One of the principal challenges to a successful recovery from Sandy has been the visible 
disconnect between existing federal recovery policies and the realities of life in densely settled 
urban neighborhoods. The Sandy long-term recovery demonstrates that federal programs prove a 
poor fit for older vintage, mixed-use, high-density urban neighborhoods. In the United States as a 
whole, only 12.6% of housing units are located in structures built prior to 1940; in New York 
City that number is three times higher (40.3%).148 Rebuilding and retrofitting older structures—
both residential and commercial—present challenges that are much different from suburban 
areas that are populated largely with single-family detached homes. Apart from their age, urban 
buildings are also more likely to be attached to one another and situated in neighborhoods that 
host a mix of uses.  
In New York City and Hoboken, such neighborhoods may contain ground-level 
commercial uses (retail, restaurant, office, and service) with upper floors supporting residential 
units or offices.149 Community uses such as schools, churches, healthcare facilities, libraries, and 
                                                 
148 See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 16. 
149 See, e.g., Hannah Frishberg, What Is a Mixed-Use Property? A Guide to the Residential-Commercial Hybrid, 
BROWNSTONER, July 27, 2016, https://www.brownstoner.com/real-estate-market/mixed-use-property-definition-
advantages-disadvantages-guide/; TIM EVANS, NEW JERSEY FUTURE, WHERE ARE WE GOING? IMPLICATIONS OF 
RECENT DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS IN NEW JERSEY (2017) (showing that Hoboken, New Jersey, is one of the few 
places in the state that is attracting millennials, in large part because of its convenient, mixed-use neighborhoods), 
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others may also be mixed into these neighborhoods at ground level or on upper floors.150 In other 
New York City region neighborhoods, light industrial uses co-exist with retail, office, hotel, and 
even residential units.151 Even in less densely populated parts of the region, such as suburban 
Long Island and New Jersey, the average densities, housing typologies, and tenure types (i.e., 
rental or home ownership) may be very different from the more typical suburban model found in 
much of the rest of the United States where single-family homes and single-use zoning are the 
norm.152  
The Sandy long-term recovery highlighted a range of ways that the Sandy region’s urban 
context frustrated the then-existing federal standards for recovery-related decisions. Regulations 
applicable to recovery might be straightforwardly applied in Montpelier, New Orleans, and 
Boulder, but they caused consternation in New York City and Hoboken.  
For instance, consider flood insurance regulations and the seemingly simple question: 
what is a basement? In many parts of the country that would cause little confusion; according to 
the NFIP, a basement is “[a]ny area of the building having its floor subgrade (below ground 
level) on all sides.”153 However, this seemingly straightforward definition became a source of 
significant concern for many building owners after Sandy.154 In New York City, Hoboken, Jersey 
City, and other municipalities in the region, the NFIP definition of a basement also technically 
describes many thousands of housing and retail units at the lowest level of attached row houses 
that are known in the local vernacular as “ground floor” or “garden” units.155 Such units may be 
located anywhere from a few inches to three feet below grade and, if conforming to stipulations 
                                                                                                                                                             
http://www.njfuture.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/New-Jersey-Future-Demographic-Trends-by-Age-September-
2017.pdf. 
150 See NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTIONS art. II, ch. 2, §22-13 (2016). 
151 See id. art. IV, ch. 2, §§42-02, 42-483, 42-00 (2017) (The table in §42-00 shows the use groups permitted in 
manufacturing districts, including commercial use.). 
152 See STEVEN G. WILSON ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PATTERNS OF METROPOLITAN AND MICROPOLITAN 
POPULATION CHANGE: 2000 TO 2010, 2010 CENSUS SPECIAL REPORTS 22 (2012), 
https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/reports/c2010sr-01.pdf.  
153 See FEMA, DEFINITIONS (2011), https://www.fema.gov/pdf/nfip/manual201205/content/22_definitions.pdf. 
154 See LLOYD DIXON ET AL., RAND CENTER FOR CATASTROPHIC RISK MANAGEMENT AND COMPENSATION, FLOOD 
INSURANCE IN NEW YORK CITY FOLLOWING HURRICANE SANDY 17 (2013). 
155 See CHRIS STURM & NICHOLAS DICKERSON, NEW JERSEY FUTURE, RIPPLE EFFECTS: THE STATE OF WATER 
INFRASTRUCTURE IN NEW JERSEY CITIES AND WHY IT MATTERS 22, 24-25 (2014) (describing “garden-level 
apartments” as “ground level spaces that are in fact partly below grade”), http://www.njfuture.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/05/Hoboken_Final.pdf. 
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in local laws, are legal for use as individual apartments, shops, offices, or fully habitable levels 
of a single-family home.156 Many buildings containing this kind of unit actually have an 
additional cellar or basement level underneath this “ground” level.157 However, while these units 
may sit above a second basement, and although they are discrete legal residences or commercial 
units according to local zoning and building codes, these units are classified as basements and 
are therefore ineligible for NFIP reimbursement.158  
One infamous case involved a Hoboken resident whose NFIP claim was denied because 
his apartment was determined to be 0.13 inches below grade.159 As Hoboken Mayor Dawn 
Zimmer testified to the Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship in December 
2012, this rigid and overbroad definition of basement exemplifies the disconnect between one-
size-fits-most federal recovery policy and the realities found in many American cities, especially 
older coastal cities: 
These rules do not reflect the reality that in places like Hoboken, New York City, 
and other urban areas, the premises characterized as basements house vibrant 
businesses and principal residences which are critical elements to the vibrancy of 
our cities. A store or apartment that requires you to walk down one or two steps is 
plain and simply not a basement. The business owners and residents who work 
and live in these stores and homes are required to buy flood insurance, are 
required to pay premiums into the flood insurance system, yet they receive 
virtually no coverage.160 
 
                                                 
156 See, e.g., N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW §34 (2018).  
157 See Hannah Frishberg, Do You Call It a Basement or Cellar? In New York, the Difference Is a Legal Matter, 
BROWNSTONER, Feb. 18, 2016, https://www.brownstoner.com/real-estate-market/cellar-vs-basement-nyc-renting-
legal-living/.  
158 See Katie Zezima, Superstorm Challenges Definition of Basement in NJ, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Jan. 20, 2013, 
http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-superstorm-challenges-definition-of-basement-in-nj-2013jan20-
story.html.  
159 See Steven A. Meyerowitz, Garden-level Condo Ruled a “Basement” Under Flood Insurance Policy, 
PROPERTYCASUALTY360, Sept. 6, 2017, http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2017/09/06/garden-level-condo-
ruled-a-basement-under-flood-in?slreturn=1517951514.  
160 See Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship, 112th Cong. (2012) 
(testimony of Dawn Zimmer, Mayor of Hoboken, New Jersey), 
https://www.sbc.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/hearings?Id=64E7DB5E-9AF7-4D27-93DF-
45E1AF243EE6&Statement_id=E3D88AF7-4DE1-425A-8B47-E67BC3E6C3B9.   
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As Mayor Zimmer’s comments underscore, the NFIP’s definition of a basement failed to 
capture the subtle, but essential, nuances differentiating structures common to Hoboken and 
Brooklyn from those often encountered in Topeka or Tuscaloosa. The consequences of this 
regulatory disconnect were significant. Hundreds of residents and business owners were denied 
their flood insurance payouts, thus crippling their family or business efforts to recover.161 
The NFIP’s broad definition for “basement” may be well suited for contemporary or 
modern structures; however, for significant parts of the Sandy region’s older and more dense 
building stock, this provides just one example of federal recovery policy poorly calibrated to 
address recovery from major natural hazards.  
Another example relates to the way in which the NFIP recognizes compliance with NFIP 
guidelines for rebuilding in the flood zone. The NFIP recognizes four categories of compliance 
eligible for NFIP funding after a damaging event: relocation, demolition, elevation, or 
floodproofing.162 Each of the four categories has specific and unique challenges in the New York 
metro area. In a practical sense, relocation of buildings attached to their neighbors presents 
extraordinary logistical challenges and, thus, is expensive. Moreover, there is scant available 
land to relocate structures, let alone space to move entire urban neighborhoods.163  
Except for a small area in the New York City borough of Staten Island and a few 
locations in Nassau and Suffolk Counties on Long Island that were part of a modest New York 
state-sponsored program, property buyout and acquisition programs have not been considered 
necessary or realistic.164 Relocation and demolition have also largely been politically infeasible 
in the post-Sandy dialogue; as then-mayor Michael Bloomberg stated in June 2013, “We cannot 
and will not abandon our waterfront. It’s one of our greatest assets. We must protect it, not 
                                                 
161 See Emmarie Huetteman, New Jersey Representative, Citing Fraud, Calls on Congress to Investigate FEMA, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/29/nyregion/new-jersey-congressman-citing-fraud-
calls-on-congress-to-investigate-fema.html.  
 
162 See FEMA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM DWELLING 
FORM STANDARD FLOOD INSURANCE POLICY 10, 32, 52 (2011) (“compliance activities eligible for payment are: 
elevation, floodproofing, relocation, or demolition (or any combination of these activities) of your structure”) 
[hereinafter NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM DWELLING FORM], 
https://www.fema.gov/pdf/nfip/manual201205/content/15_policy.pdf. 
163 See, e.g., Joyce Cohen, Finding a Vacant Lot to Buy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2007 (examining the distinct lack of 
vacant lots available in New York City as of 2007), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/13/realestate/15hunt.side.web.html.  
164 See GOSR, Buyout & Acquisition Programs, https://stormrecovery.ny.gov/housing/buyout-acquisition-programs 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2018).  
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retreat from it.”165 Thus, elevation and floodproofing have remained as the predominant 
strategies used by property owners looking to rebuild and remain NFIP compliant.  
Floodproofing older and attached buildings can be challenging, but most can be 
overcome even if they create additional expenses for property owners; elevation, however, 
creates many more challenges in a dense urban context. FEMA promotes elevation of structures 
as one of the most effective ways to protect against future flood-related risk.166 In many Sandy-
affected communities, elevation has been considered undesirable because it is expensive, 
inconvenient (because it creates the need to use stairs or ramps to access a building), and 
aesthetically undesirable (because it fundamentally alters the character of a neighborhood).167 
These grievances are not unique to the Sandy region, but local conditions create an additional 
layer of challenges.  
Party-wall structures such as row houses and mid-rise commercial and mixed-use 
buildings, which are common in the region, are extremely difficult to elevate from an 
engineering perspective and often almost impossible from a financial perspective.168 In many 
cases, elevation may cost more than the building is worth.169 Moreover, in the New York metro 
region, a significant percentage of these attached units are masonry and steel frame construction, 
which are inherently more resistant to flood-related risks than building typologies more common 
in other parts of the United States (e.g., balloon-framed, sheetrock-walled single-family homes 
and slab-on-grade commercial buildings).170 However, this inherent resiliency is not accounted 
for in NFIP guidelines.171  
                                                 
165 See Jarrett Murphy, Sandy+3: NYC Not Pulling Back From the Water’s Edge, CITY LIMITS, Oct. 14, 2015, 
https://citylimits.org/2015/10/14/sandy3-nyc-not-pulling-back-from-the-waters-edge/. 
166 See FEMA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, HOMEOWNER’S GUIDE TO RETROFITTING: SIX WAYS TO 
PROTECT YOUR HOME FROM FLOODING 5-1 (3d ed. 2014), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/1404148604102-f210b5e43aba0fb393443fe7ae9cd953/FEMA_P-312.pdf.  
167 See Elizabeth A. Harris, Going Up a Few Feet, and Hoping to Avoid a Storm’s Path, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2013, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/nyregion/after-hurricane-sandy-homeowners-elevate-property.html. 
168 See ALEXANDROS WASHBURN, THE NATURE OF URBAN DESIGN: A NEW YORK PERSPECTIVE ON RESILIENCE 187 
(2015) (briefly describing the difficulties in raising party-wall structures, both due to cost and inability to raise just a 
single structure that is part of the party wall).  
169 See Alice Gainer, New York to Spend Up to $300M to Raise Homes in Flood Zone, CBS N.Y., July 30, 2014 
(noting that the cost of elevating a home can rise above $200,000), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2014/07/30/new-
york-to-spend-300m-to-raise-homes-in-flood-zone/. 
170 See Joseph Lstiburek, BSD-111: Flood and Hurricane Resistant Buildings, BUILDING SCI. CORP., Oct. 26, 2006, 
https://buildingscience.com/documents/digests/bsd-111-flood-and-hurricane-resistant-buildings.  
171 See RESILIENT RETAIL, supra note 18. 
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Elevation can also come into conflict with other federal policies. Use of public funds for 
reconstruction, and in older buildings the mere act of doing the reconstruction regardless of the 
funding source, may trigger mandatory compliance with the Americans With Disabilities Act 
(ADA).172 But ADA compliance, in turn, may be complicated by the design of the existing 
building, further complicated by the elevation strategy, and, finally, constrained by local building 
and zoning codes.173  
For instance, in a publicly accessible building with ground-floor access that is already 
built to the edge of the property line, any alteration (e.g., elevation) would trigger an ADA 
requirement that “to the maximum extent feasible, the altered portions of the facility are readily 
accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities, including individuals who use 
wheelchairs.”174 In practice, this would require the building owner to add an elevator or entrance 
ramps reaching the design flood elevation (DFE) (i.e., the base flood elevation, or BFE, plus an 
additional amount dictated by local law; this additional increment above the BFE is known as 
“freeboard”). But, in New York City, ramps are permitted obstructions for only 44 inches past 
the build-to line on the parcel’s street-facing facade, which in many cases is insufficient space to 
provide a useable and ADA-compliant ramp.175 These types of conflict between NFIP 
requirements and local codes are further explored in Section V.D.  
 
B. Navigating Forms of Ownership That Predominate in Urban Neighborhoods 
Other issues beyond physical design can also create challenges when attempting to apply 
narrowly designed federal recovery programs in dense urban environments, and even the most 
fundamental property law questions regarding form of ownership can become significant.176 A 
particular recovery challenge in New York City, and one that would also be pertinent to a lesser 
                                                 
172 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 2010 ADA STANDARDS FOR ACCESSIBLE DESIGN 21 (2010), 
https://www.ada.gov/regs2010/2010ADAStandards/2010ADAStandards.pdf. 
173 See, e.g., CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE ADA AND CITY GOVERNMENTS: COMMON 
PROBLEMS (2009), https://www.ada.gov/comprob.pdf; Whole Building Design Guide, Provide Accessibility for 
Historic Buildings, https://www.wbdg.org/design-objectives/historic-preservation/provide-accessibility-historic-
buildings (last updated Sept. 28, 2017).  
174 See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 172. 
175 See RESILIENT RETAIL, supra note 18. 
176 See, e.g., Staying on Task in Louisiana, APPLESEED NETWORK, Nov. 11, 2011 (post-Katrina and post-Rita 
exposed issues with families not having clear title to land passed down through generations outside of the legal 
system), http://www.appleseednetwork.org/11_21_2011/. 
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degree in other large cities like Miami, Chicago, or Washington, D.C., is the presence of 
significant numbers of cooperative and condominium apartment buildings. Of New York City’s 
3.4 million housing units in 2014, almost 10% (330,679 units) were located in buildings under 
the cooperative form of ownership and another 5% were condominiums.177 New York 
University’s Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy estimates that 20% of the housing 
units in Sandy’s flood zone were cooperatives and another 8% were condominiums.178  
For owners of such units there are multiple barriers to recovery under existing law. As 
currently interpreted by FEMA, the Stafford Act restricts the aid available to cooperatives and 
condominiums because of the way that ownership of these housing units is structured from a 
legal perspective.179 Condominium units are real property owned by individual owners who live 
in their units and pay dues to a condominium association that maintains common areas of the 
building or complex.180 As such, individual condominium unit owners can legally insure their 
units against flood damage by purchasing the NFIP’s Standard Flood Insurance Policy Dwelling 
Form just as a single-family homeowner would.181 Alternatively, condominium associations may 
elect to insure the entire building or complex (including both common areas as well as residential 
units) through an NFIP Residential Condominium Building Association Policy (RCBAP). An 
RCBAP offers coverage for either the full replacement cost of the building, including funds to 
repair or replace the foundation and supporting structures, or $250,000 multiplied by the number 
of units in the building, whichever amount is smaller.182 Content insurance for $100,000 per unit 
is also available.183  
However, if a condominium association elects not to purchase an RCBAP, individual unit 
owners (as members of the condominium association) are then liable for repair of damaged 
                                                 
177 See NEW YORK CITY RENT GUIDELINES BOARD, 2017 HOUSING SUPPLY REPORT 4 (2017), 
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/rentguidelinesboard/pdf/17HSR.pdf.  
178 See Mireya Navarro, U.S. Rules Bar Aid to Co-ops Hit by Sandy, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/02/nyregion/fema-policy-keeps-co-ops-from-disaster-aid.html.  
179 Id. 
180 See NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM DWELLING FORM, supra note 162, at 6. 
181 Id. at 5. 
182 See FEMA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM FLOOD 
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common areas out of pocket. While the Stafford Act authorizes FEMA to provide emergency 
recovery funds for repair of uninsured or underinsured owner-occupied primary residences under 
the HA portion of the IHP, FEMA holds that the Stafford Act “does not provide the Agency with 
the authority to award grants to housing cooperatives and condominium associations to repair 
common-area damage as they are not, by any definition, individuals or households and are 
considered business associations.”184 In many condominiums in the Sandy region without 
RCBAP coverage, repairs to common elements (e.g., roofs, lobbies, stairwells, elevators, heating 
and cooling equipment) were $250,000 or more, and could only be paid through assessments on 
the owners of units in the association.185 It is troubling and instructive that this costly disconnect 
between FEMA program regulations and the condominium form of ownership could have been 
anticipated, because this programmatic shortcoming was noted as far back as the 1994 
Northridge (California) earthquake. It was never resolved in the interim.186 
The situation for cooperatives is even more restrictive. Unlike condominiums, owners of 
cooperative units do not own real property. Rather, they own shares in a nonprofit corporation 
(the “cooperative”) that, in turn, owns the entirety of the building or complex. Shareholders sign 
proprietary leases giving them the legal right to occupy a specific unit within the complex. Under 
current FEMA regulations, cooperatives are considered businesses, so individual unit owners are 
in effect not primarily residents at all, but simply corporate shareholders.187 They are thus 
ineligible to purchase property insurance through the NFIP because they do not technically own 
a residence.188 This legal distinction creates a challenge for residents of cooperatives, especially 
those on low floors during flood events who are not eligible to purchase NFIP coverage even if 
                                                 
184 See FEMA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, INDIVIDUAL ASSISTANCE FOR HOUSING COOPERATIVES 
AND CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATIONS 6 (2016) [hereinafter INDIVIDUAL ASSISTANCE FOR HOUSING COOPERATIVES 
AND CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATIONS], https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FEMA%20-
%20Individual%20Assistance%20for%20Housing%20Cooperatives%20and%20Condominium%20Associations%2
0-%20FY%202016.pdf. 
185 See, e.g., Navarro, supra note 178 (more than $500,000 in damages to seven-story condominium building). 
186 See Robert B. Olshansky et al., Rebuilding Communities Following Disaster: Lessons From Kobe and Los 
Angeles, 32 BUILT ENV’T 354 (2006). 
187 See INDIVIDUAL ASSISTANCE FOR HOUSING COOPERATIVES AND CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 184, 
at 2. 
188 Id. Cooperatives are, however, eligible to purchase up to $100,000 of contents coverage under the Dwelling 
Form, which is also available to renters, dormitory residents, and residents of assisted living facilities. See NFIP 
FLOOD INSURANCE MANUAL, supra note 182. 
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they own an apartment in the floodplain.189 Moreover, while cooperative corporations can 
purchase NFIP coverage to insure common areas for a maximum of $250,000 under the General 
Property Form, cooperatives are specifically ineligible for the much more substantial coverage 
available under the RCBAP.190 This dynamic leaves cooperative owners—even more so than 
condominium owners—deeply exposed to liability for significant costs if their building’s 
common areas or essential infrastructure are damaged by flooding.  
Cooperative ownership further restricts coverage for recovery in other ways as well. 
While uninsured residents of cooperative units are eligible for FEMA assistance under §408 of 
the Stafford Act (i.e., HA and other needs assistance components of the IHP),191 the legal 
structure of a cooperative limits how HA funds can be spent. Unlike condominiums, cooperative 
shareholders do not own the units in which they reside; rather, they rent the units from the 
corporation of which they are also an owner. Thus, because individual units are not considered 
“owner-occupied,” HA funds cannot be used to repair damaged walls, ceilings, floors, or 
windows, all of which are property of the cooperative corporation, not individual 
shareholder/tenants that reside in affected units.192  
These debilitating limitations on NFIP coverage and FEMA assistance for condominium 
and cooperative owners were widely felt across the region after Sandy.  
In response, then-Rep. Steve Israel (D-N.Y.) introduced H.R. 2887 in July 2013 “[t]o 
amend the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act to provide 
assistance for condominiums and housing cooperatives damaged by a major disaster, and for 
other purposes,” which was eventually referred to the Subcommittee on Economic Development, 
                                                 
189 See NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM DWELLING FORM, supra note 162, at 5 (NFIP standard flood 
insurance coverage only offered to non-condominium residential buildings designed for principal use as a dwelling 
for one to four families, or a single-family dwelling unit in a condominium building). 
190 See NFIP FLOOD INSURANCE MANUAL, supra note 182, at GR 7. 
191 See INDIVIDUAL ASSISTANCE FOR HOUSING COOPERATIVES AND CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 184, 
at 3. 
192 See FEMA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, INDIVIDUALS AND HOUSEHOLDS PROGRAM UNIFIED 
GUIDANCE (IHPUG) 19 (2016), https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1483567080828-
1201b6eebf9fbbd7c8a070fddb308971/FEMAIHPUG_CoverEdit_December2016.pdf. However, cooperatives, 
condominium associations, and homeowner’s associations are eligible for low-interest SBA loans of up to $2 
million for repair of common areas and infrastructure. Residents may apply for up to $200,000 for repair of their 
units and an additional $40,000 to replace personal property.  
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Public Buildings, and Emergency Management.193 However, Congress took no further action on 
the bill.194 To address some of the challenges H.R. 2887 would have rectified, certain ad hoc 
solutions were created by state and local governments. New York City structured the Rapid 
Repairs Program to include cooperatives and condominiums while Build It Back contained the 
Multi-family Program for rental properties, condominiums, and cooperatives.195 New York state 
developed the Cooperative and Condominium Recovery Program to assist cooperatives, 
condominium associations, and homeowner associations in funding repairs to common areas and 
individual units.196  
While condominium and cooperative ownership is much more common in the New York 
metro region than in many other parts of the country, these challenges nonetheless highlight the 
inherent difficulty in crafting one-size-fits-most national policies in the face of varying local 
conditions. Every community has its own mix of specific land use patterns, building typologies, 
and occupancy types (i.e., rental, ownership, informal, etc.). The way these issues interact with 
federal recovery regulations will vary from place to place, and it is inevitable that an approach 
designed to best address the needs primarily of owners of single-family, standalone, owner-
occupied housing will not be as effective for residents of other kinds of properties. This points to 
the enduring challenge of developing recovery policies that are simultaneously effective and 
flexible, but lack of flexible recovery policies is not only a challenge for dense urban 
communities.  
Another excellent example would be the higher rates of so-called “heirs’ property”—
families living in homes where legal title remains in long-deceased relatives—in some parts of 
the United States.197 These deceased relatives lacked wills passing title to their property to 
                                                 
193 See Congress.gov, Actions Overview H.R. 2887—113th Cong. (2013-2014), https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-
congress/house-bill/2887/actions (last visited Apr. 19, 2018). 
194 Id. 
195 See NYC Build It Back, Multi-family Program, 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/recovery/html/landlords/landlords.shtml#more-information (last visited Apr. 19, 2018). 
196 See GOVERNOR’S OFFICE OF STORM RECOVERY OF THE HOUSING TRUST FUND CORPORATION OFFICE OF 
COMMUNITY RENEWAL, CONDOMINIUM/COOPERATIVE PROGRAM GUIDEBOOK (2016), 
https://stormrecovery.ny.gov/sites/default/files/crp/community/documents/20161003_Condo-
Coop%20Guidebook%20FINAL.pdf. 
197 See Center for Heirs’ Property Preservation, What Is Heirs’ Property?, http://www.heirsproperty.org/who-we-
are/what-is-heirs-property (last visited Apr. 19, 2018).  
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family, or their family did not settle their estate following the relative’s death.198 This means 
current occupants cannot show “clear title” to storm-damaged property and, thus, cannot receive 
federal disaster funds for home repair.199 This has been recognized as a major impediment to 
recovery in the southern United States’ Black Belt where a large number of African Americans 
were historically excluded from, or did not use, legal channels to pass property from one 
generation to the next.200 For a more recent example, following 2017’s Hurricane Maria, 
thousands of residents of Puerto Rico were denied federal recovery aid because they could not 
supply evidence that they owned their homes, or even proof of residence.201 As Politico reported 
in 2017, “More than half of Puerto Rico’s houses are ‘informal,’ a euphemism for illegally 
constructed. As many as one in five are built on private or government land.”202 Until federal 
policies can be developed that are sensitive to these varied and unique place-based ownership 
issues, these kinds of challenges will remain.  
 
C. Helping Businesses Address Operational and Physical Recovery Challenges 
Post-Sandy recovery challenges were not constrained to homeowners and residential renters. 
Businesses in the region also faced their own set of vexing recovery challenges after Sandy. 
Sandy’s impacts were widespread, affecting not only the coastal neighborhoods that contain 
many of the region’s small industrial businesses, but also retail stores, restaurants, and other 
types of businesses.203 Foremost among these challenges were insurance-related issues. While 
lenders typically require mortgaged properties in SFHAs to have flood insurance, coverage is 
optional for properties located in the SFHA that are owned outright as well as for all businesses 
outside the SFHA.  
                                                 
198 See, e.g., Staying on Task in Louisiana, supra note 176. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
201 See Adrian Florido, Unable to Prove They Own Their Homes, Puerto Ricans Denied FEMA Help, WABE, Mar. 
21, 2018, https://www.wabe.org/unable-to-prove-they-own-their-homes-puerto-ricans-denied-fema-help/. 
202 See Lorraine Woellert, “We Have a Big Problem”: Puerto Rico Seeks Aid for Tens of Thousands of Squatters, 
POLITICO, Dec. 31, 2017, https://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/31/puerto-rico-squatters-hurricane-261495.  
203 See, e.g., Al McClain, Hurricane Sandy Wreaks Havoc but Impact on Retail Mixed, RETAILWIRE, Oct. 31, 2012 
(discussing the lengths to which large retail chains went in order to minimize impact from Sandy), 
http://www.retailwire.com/discussion/hurricane-sandy-wreaks-havoc-but-impact-on-retail-mixed/; Max Falkowitz, 
How Hurricane Sandy Is Affecting Restaurants in NYC, SERIOUS EATS, Nov. 2, 2012 (examining the difficulties 
New York City restaurants faced in the aftermath of Sandy), https://newyork.seriouseats.com/2012/11/hurricane-
sandy-restaurants-nyc-damages.html. 
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But FEMA’s flood insurance rate maps (FIRMs) in place in 2012 when Sandy struck 
were primarily based on data collected in 1983, and the amount of land flooded during Sandy 
was more than 50% larger than the SFHA delineated on the existing FIRMs.204 Because many 
businesses were outside the current SFHA, many did not purchase flood insurance, and most 
commercial policies exclude flooding from their coverage.205 Additionally, many businesses do 
not own the buildings that they are located in and are thus not allowed to purchase coverage for 
the building through the NFIP, making them reliant on landlords to either purchase flood 
insurance for the building or pay for repairs directly.  
At the same time, even for those businesses with flood insurance, whether located inside 
or outside the SFHA, coverage was often inadequate, especially for businesses with expensive 
equipment or inventory, because the NFIP limits compensation for businesses to $500,000 for 
structural damage and an additional $500,000 for contents.206 There were also other NFIP 
limitations. Sewer backups, for instance, which were common after Sandy even in 
neighborhoods that did not experience surface flooding, are not covered by the NFIP unless the 
backup “is a direct result of flooding.”207  
The NFIP also does not cover vehicles.208 Many manufacturing and service-related 
businesses affected by Sandy rely heavily on vehicles as part of their operations. While some 
owners of affected business did have optional flood coverage on their business vehicles, many 
did not. In an additional layer of irony, many of these same businesses, such as those with heavy 
equipment that could be used in debris removal or infrastructure repair projects, experienced an 
increased demand for their services and a potential windfall after Sandy, but were unable to 
capitalize on the opportunity because of the damage they sustained and their inability to finance 
their recovery.  
                                                 
204 See NEW YORK CITY MAYOR’S OFFICE OF RECOVERY AND RESILIENCY, A STRONGER, MORE RESILIENT NEW 
YORK 23 (2013), http://s-media.nyc.gov/agencies/sirr/SIRR_spreads_Hi_Res.pdf.  
205 See Bankers Insurance Group, Commercial Flood Insurance Questions, 
https://www.bankersinsurance.com/business-flood-insurance.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2018).  
206 See NFIP FLOOD INSURANCE MANUAL, supra note 182, at RATE 1. 
207 See News Release, FEMA, NFIP Flood Insurance Can Protect Against Financial Devastation (Sept. 20, 2017), 
https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2017/09/20/nfip-flood-insurance-can-protect-against-financial-devastation.  
208 See FEMA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM SUMMARY OF 
COVERAGE FOR COMMERCIAL PROPERTY 2 (specifically noting that cars are not covered), 
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/6a2ad0291e8d6a5452aa891a6c037039/fema_Summary_508C.pdf. 
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Finally, turning to the physical aspect of recovery, businesses forced to elevate as a 
recovery and mitigation strategy face a cascading set of design and operations challenges. Unlike 
in areas where most trips are made by automobile, commercial success in dense urban regions 
often depends on “foot traffic” or easy pedestrian access to commercial and service uses in 
ground-floor spaces.209 FEMA only allows space below the BFE in an elevated building to be 
used for building access, automobile parking, and storage. This means that what had been a 
“ground floor” business may have to relocate substantially above grade, thereby impacting its 
ability to attract pedestrian customers.210  
Again, basements can also become a complicating issue. Due to the high cost of real 
estate and typically small floor plan of buildings in the Sandy region, many businesses rely on 
basements to provide space for functions like restrooms and offices, thereby freeing up more 
valuable ground-floor space for core business uses.211 If forced to move these supporting uses 
out of the basement, and potentially even above the ground floor, businesses lose a significant 
amount of space for inventory or restaurant seating or other more lucrative uses. Restaurants face 
an additional challenge; many rely on basements or cellars to provide space for “prep 
kitchens.”212 This restaurant layout strategy provides more seating on the (typically much more 
expensive) ground-floor space. Thus, while meeting NFIP programmatic requirements will help 
make businesses more resilient to future storms and allow them to qualify for NFIP coverage, 
these kinds of mitigation measures will also have significant long-term negative financial 
implications.213  
                                                 
209 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER B. LEINBERGER & MARIELA ALFONZO, METROPOLITAN POLICY PROGRAM AT 
BROOKINGS, WALK THIS WAY: THE ECONOMIC PROMISE OF WALKABLE PLACES IN METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON, 
D.C. (2012) (discussing how walkability of an area led to better economic performance in Washington, D.C., among 
other benefits such as decreased transportation costs in higher walkability areas, and the association between higher 
walkability and higher education and affluence), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/25-
walkable-places-leinberger.pdf; see also CHRISTOPHER B. LEINBERGER & MICHAEL RODRIGUEZ, GEORGE 
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, FOOT TRAFFIC AHEAD: RANKING WALKABLE URBANISM IN 
AMERICA’S LARGEST METROS—2016 (2016) (ranking walkability in cities and having general discussions on the 
benefits of walkability in cities), https://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/app/legacy/documents/foot-traffic-ahead-
2016.pdf.  
210 See RESILIENT RETAIL, supra note 18, at 31. 
211 See id. at 26. 
212 See ERIC RIPERT & CHRISTINE MUHLKE, ON THE LINE 21 (2008) (“Most New York restaurants have their (small) 
offices, prep kitchens, and locker rooms in the basement”). 
213 See Cynthia Scarinci, A Post-Superstorm Sandy Study of Small Business Disaster Preparedness and Perspectives 
on Planning for Future Incidents, 3 J. INT’L & INTERDISC. BUS. RES. 61-74 (2016), available at 
https://scholars.fhsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1078&context=jiibr.  




D. Local Government Ordinances as Hidden Obstacles to Recovery: The Example of 
Zoning Codes  
Local land development functions, including formulating and administering zoning and building 
codes, play important roles in guiding community recovery. These functions can either be 
vectors for safer, more efficient growth or obstacles to recovery. In long-term recovery processes 
sometimes characterized by press coverage of brazen contractor fraud,214 monumental rebuilding 
projects,215 and alarming bureaucratic breakdowns,216 problems created by local ordinances seem 
like low-level annoyances. Local code requirements are less likely to make headlines. Zoning 
code problems are inherently local and vary based on the town, city, or county where a 
homeowner or business is located.217 Zoning code issues are also difficult for most people to 
appreciate because they involve technical legal language. Perhaps the main reason local code 
requirements remain “hidden in plain sight” following a disaster is that local governments do not 
begin to appreciate the problem until rebuilding has begun. The Sandy long-term recovery 
experience suggests that local zoning and building codes have indeed created some unnecessary 
obstacles to recovery.  
Although discrete and technical by nature, the comparatively latent character of zoning 
codes’ role in long-term disaster recovery cannot be overlooked if communities wish to rebound 
from disaster in a timely and equitable manner. Local code compliance, including building 
codes, health and safety codes, and zoning codes, is still a requirement for post-disaster recovery 
projects.218 Compliance with local codes authorizes local permits, which in turn allows 
                                                 
214 See Jeff Jeffrey, Texas Moves to Head Off Contractor Fraud Following Hurricane Harvey, BUS. JOURNALS, Aug. 
29, 2017, https://www.bizjournals.com/bizjournals/news/2017/08/29/texas-moves-to-head-off-contractor-fraud-
following.html. 
215 See John Burnett, All Things Considered: Billions Spent on Flood Barriers, but New Orleans Still a “Fish Bowl,” 
NPR, Aug. 28, 2015, https://www.npr.org/2015/08/28/432059261/billions-spent-on-flood-barriers-but-new-orleans-
still-a-fishbowl. 
216 See Heather Haddon & Josh Dawsey, Ousted Firm Blames New Jersey for Sandy Ills, WALL ST. J., June 13, 
2014, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ousted-firm-blames-new-jersey-for-sandy-ills-1402706424. 
217 See Bari Faye Siegel, Zoning: One Size Does Not Fill All: Disaster Recovery Experts Must Follow Every Law 
Governing Every Municipality, NJBIZ, Oct. 16, 2017 (“In New Jersey, every municipality has its own rules for 
almost everything. This is especially true when it comes to zoning laws. . . .”), 
http://www.njbiz.com/article/20171016/NJBIZ01/310169998/zoning-one-size-does-not-fit-all-disaster-recovery-
experts-must-follow-every-law-governing-every-municipality. 
218 See generally Joseph G. Jarret and Michele L. Lieberman, “When the Wind Blows:” The Role of the Local 
Government Attorney Before, During, and in the Aftermath of a Disaster, 36 STETSON L. REV. 293, 294 (2007) 
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individual recovery projects to proceed. While unnecessary or narrowly conceived zoning code 
requirements may create merely inconvenient recovery delays for families with ample financial 
resources, for low- and moderate-income families including many elderly households, inapt 
zoning requirements can create a significant barrier to rebuilding a home or business.  
At the very least, confusing or burdensome local requirements can saddle disaster victims 
with additional expenses and delays that they cannot easily afford, especially if they lack access 
to savings, insurance, or professional assistance that can help secure favorable local government 
review of a zoning application. Before disasters strike, local governments must consider how 
local codes and processes can be designed or modified in advance to help residents rebuild 
safely, sustainably, and quickly. This section highlights three ways in which local codes can 
prove ill-suited to post-disaster recovery needs using examples from Sandy.  
 
1. Dimensional zoning requirements: Post-disaster repairs and modifications that 
transgress height and set-back limitations 
Images of Sandy’s devastating impact frequently showed homes sitting cheek-and-jowl with one 
another.219 On the Jersey Shore and in coastal Long Island neighborhoods, homes were pushed 
from their foundations by storm surge and thousands of homeowners were forced to comply with 
federal requirements to elevate structures above the BFE in order to remain eligible for NFIP 
coverage against future storms.220 Other homeowners in high-risk areas decided it was simply 
prudent to elevate, even though their homes did not incur significant damage during Sandy.221 
However, generally speaking, no homeowner was allowed to elevate a home in violation of local 
                                                                                                                                                             
(“Failure to follow the requirements of all applicable laws during each phase of a disaster may significantly impact a 
local government's ability to receive assistance in its most crucial time of need”). 
219 See, e.g., Sarah Jacobs, 31 Photos That Show the Destruction of Hurricane Sandy 5 Years Ago, BUS. INSIDER, 
Oct. 24, 2017 (highlight photos of Sandy’s impact on Long Island’s Breezy Point neighborhood), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/a-look-back-at-sandys-destruction-2016-9. 
220 In New York City alone, 628 homeowners were granted permission to elevate their homes on or before Sandy’s 
fifth anniversary. See Bridget Downes & Anthony Rifilato, Hurricane Sandy, Five Years On: Some Residents Are 
Still Displaced, Rebuilding, LI HERALD.COM, Oct. 26, 2017, 
http://www.liherald.com/eastrockaway/stories/hurricane-sandy-five-years-on,97044. In October 2017, 282 permits 
for elevation were still pending. See id. 
221 See Mary Colleen Robinson, House Raising, Booming Since Sandy, a Dangerous and Expensive Industry, OCEAN 
COUNTY LONG TERM RECOVERY GROUP, Jan. 13, 2017, https://oceancountyltrg.org/house-raising-booming-since-
sandy-a-dangerous-and-expensive-industry/.  
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government set-back or height requirements merely because it was necessary or prudent.222 
Construction could not proceed without compliance with local zoning and building codes. 
Dimensional zoning requirements are code provisions that limit a building’s size or 
envelope. Height limitations, for instance, cap a building’s elevation above street level.223 Set-
back limitations establish a minimum distance between the structure and the edge of the property 
it improves.224 A proposed structure demonstrating anything less than exacting compliance with 
these and similar standards generally requires a building owner to seek relief from a local 
government in the form of a variance.225 There is little dispute that building height and set-back 
requirements serve a valuable purpose.  
In urbanized settings, where land is scarce and often expensive, structures should be sited 
in a manner that promotes harmony with surrounding buildings. Property owners seeking relief 
from these requirements must typically prepare a detailed technical application, pay a fee, and 
wait for a hearing date before the local government’s variance review board.226 No building 
permit or certificate of occupancy will be issued if, without a variance, the structure exceeds the 
local government height or set-back requirements.227 At best, the process takes weeks. At worst, 
it extends for months, particularly following a disaster when the hearing docket is long.228  
Variances from height and set-back requirements generally allow individual homeowners 
a reprieve from otherwise rigid zoning code provisions that are somehow uniquely burdensome 
                                                 
222 See New NJ Law Allows Nonconforming Uses to Be Elevated Without Variance, SHORENEWSTODAY, Aug. 9, 
2013, http://www.shorenewstoday.com/ocean_city/news/new-nj-law-allows-nonconforming-uses-to-be-elevated-
without/article_cd8c0d0e-b156-5ea5-aa3b-2d8484a6ff1a.html.  
223 See JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW §4:12 
(3d ed. 2013). 
224 See 36 N.J. PRAC., LAND USE LAW §3.29 (3d ed.). 
225 See 2 N.Y. ZONING LAW & PRAC. §§29:1, 29:5. 
226 See DWIGHT H. MERRIAM & SARA C. BRONIN, RATHKOPF’S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING §58:1 (4th ed. 
2016). 
 
227 See AMANDA DEVECKA-RINEAR ET AL., THE LONG ROAD HOME: UNDERSTANDING SANDY RECOVERY AND 
LESSONS FOR FUTURE STORMS FIVE YEARS LATER 46 (2017) (explaining that while some New Jersey local 
governments waived permitting requirements and permitting fees, others did not, thus delaying homeowner recovery 
in certain situations). 
228 See, e.g., Santino & D’Esposito Make It Easier to Elevate Sandy-Slammed Houses—Proposal Exempts More 
Flood-prone Homes From Building Variance Requirements, TOWN HEMPSTEAD, Aug. 1, 2016 (“[t]he time required 
to secure a variance could add as much as two months to the building process”), https://www.toh.li/news/1523-
santino-d-esposito-make-it-easier-to-elevate-sandy-slammed-houses-proposal-exempts-more-flood-prone-homes-
from-building-variance-requirements. 
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to a specific property owner. For instance, odd shaped lots, uniquely steep terrain, and other 
physical characteristics are typically grounds for a variance request. But should the requirement 
for seeking a variance be imposed when the applicant’s request for relief is in response to an 
external agency’s requirement or when it stems from a desire to make a potentially vulnerable 
structure less vulnerable to a future hazard event? Not all communities agree.  
Following Sandy, some communities waived the requirement for seeking a variance to 
exceed height limitations when elevating homes as long as they were located in a flood plain.229 
Other communities still required property owners to navigate the normal local government 
variance review process.230 In the small city of Long Beach on Long Island’s southern shore, for 
instance, elevations of homes necessitated a local Board of Zoning Appeals hearing to secure 
permission to add the stairs and porches necessary to access elevated homes if those features 
encroached into required front and side yard setbacks.231 In February 2016, after approving more 
than 90 applications through this time-consuming public hearing process, the city amended its 
zoning ordinance to allow elevation and associated necessary encroachments in some city 
neighborhoods with only planning staff approval.232  
Height and set-back requirements were also quickly recognized as potential impediments 
to recovery in New York City. The city’s planners quickly recognized the challenges that would 
be created by trying to shoehorn NFIP-compliant rehabilitation and rebuilding into the city’s 
existing zoning code and building code restrictions. Three months after Sandy, FEMA issued 
new advisory base flood elevation maps for New York City that differed significantly from the 
maps in place at the time of the storm.233 On January 31, 2013, three days after the release of the 
new FEMA maps, Mayor Bloomberg issued Executive Order No. 230, Emergency Order to 
Suspend Zoning Provisions to Facilitate Reconstruction in Accordance With Enhanced Flood 
                                                 
229 See, e.g., id. 
230  See e.g., John Asbury, Home-raising Red Tape Cut in Long Beach, NEWSDAY, Feb. 23, 2016, 
https://www.newsday.com/long-island/nassau/red-tape-cut-in-long-beach-to-assist-homes-being-raised-1.11497881 
(describing the City of Long Beach’s permitting procedures). 
231 John Asbury, Home-raising Red Tape Cut in Long Beach, NEWSDAY, Feb. 23, 2016, 
https://www.newsday.com/long-island/nassau/red-tape-cut-in-long-beach-to-assist-homes-being-raised-1.11497881. 
232 See id. 
233 See Christina Boyle & Erin Durkin, FEMA Releases New Flood Maps Showing 35,000 More New York City, 
Westchester Buildings at Risk, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 29, 2013, http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/new-fema-
flood-map-doubles-at-risk-buildings-city-article-1.1249555.  
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Resistant Construction Standards.234 The order suspended height restrictions and various other 
aspects of the zoning code to facilitate rapidly rebuilding damaged structures in compliance with 
NFIP requirements. The Department of City Planning also drafted a 51-page set of zoning code 
modifications, the Flood Resilience Text Amendment, which was eventually approved by the 
New York City Council on October 9, 2013.235 The Amendment facilitates flood-resistant 
construction and rebuilding in the 100-year floodplain, addressing issues such as building height, 
ingress and egress, locating of mechanical systems and parking, as well as other planning- and 
building-related issues.236  
 
2. Properties not conforming to zoning codes pre-disaster: Amortization or 
accommodation of nonconforming structures  
Not all lots and structures comply with the letter of local zoning codes. This is a common 
phenomenon. The nonconformity may reflect that a structure predates the original or current 
code’s adoption.237 For instance, in a zoning district that allows only one residential structure on 
each lot, a lot predating the city’s original code may have been developed with two discrete 
structures.238 The nonconformity could also have arisen when a local government made a recent 
amendment to its existing code, such as an amendment establishing a new, larger minimum lot 
size, making the lot on which an existing home sits too small for the structure that currently 
improves it.  
Major disasters, such as Sandy, frequently raise questions about the fate of properties that 
were considered nonconforming prior to the disaster. If the local zoning code, as originally 
adopted or later amended, renders a property nonconforming, then the zoning code usually 
allows the owner and subsequent owners to continue using the property, subject to certain strict 
limitations.239 In these circumstances, the property is deemed legal, but nonconforming. Over the 
long term, the local government’s goal is to phase out such nonconforming properties and, 
                                                 
234 See N.Y. Exec. Order No. 230 (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/eo/eo_230.pdf. 
235 New York City Department of City Planning, Flood Resilience Text Amendment (Oct. 9, 2013), 
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/plans/flood-resiliency/final_text.pdf. 
236 See id. 
237 See JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., supra note 223, §4:31. 
238 See 2 N.Y. ZONING LAW & PRAC. §10:02.  
239 See 36 N.J. PRAC., LAND USE LAW §22.2 (3d ed.). 
PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT: Please cite from published version 
 
  
generally speaking, to prevent the owner from increasing the extent of the nonconformity.240 But 
the local government must do so in a manner that respects an owner’s property rights.  
Local zoning codes also ordinarily contain a provision calling for elimination of a 
nonconforming structure should the structure suffer substantial damage. Substantial damage 
often means a loss estimated at between 25% and 75% of the structure’s value.241 Further, 
changes to nonconforming properties are subject to tight restriction. For instance, any expansion 
of existing nonconforming structures or uses is usually forbidden. Some local governments 
require owners to navigate the time-consuming and potentially expensive public hearing process 
if the owner seeks to make any type of alteration to a nonconforming structure.242  
On the one hand, eliminating nonconformities to the local zoning code is a good goal, 
and even has a hazard mitigation component. Local governments rely on zoning code 
requirements to help ensure the health and safety of their community.243 This goal is achieved 
when the local government succeeds in eliminating nonconforming conditions that might make a 
property unusually susceptible to loss or damage during a hazard event.244 In this respect, a 
disaster could be a boon to a local government’s efforts to eliminate nonconforming uses, lot 
sizes, and structures. If a disaster displaces a family that occupies a nonconforming property, 
then the long-term recovery period from a disaster would seem to be an appropriate time to 
require the family to build a new structure that conforms to existing zoning rules (if that is a 
possible option).  
On the other hand, restrictions on post-storm repairs to, and modifications of, 
nonconforming properties may undermine a community’s post-storm recovery, particularly in 
low- and moderate-income communities where property owners may lack access to resources to 
rebuild in full compliance with existing zoning. It is important to consider whether the 
nonconformity at issue should prevent a family or business from repairing a structure and, as a 
                                                 
240 See JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., supra note 223, §§4:33, 4:35. 
241 See Pace University Elizabeth Haub School of Law, Non-conforming Users, https://law.pace.edu/non-
conforming-users (last visited Apr. 19, 2018); JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., supra note 223, §4:38. 
242 See Carlo Davis, Rewriting the Zoning Book, HUDSON REP., June 14, 2015 (explaining that the city of Hoboken 
requires owners seek a variance for any alternation of a nonconforming structure).  
243 See JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., supra note 223, §3:13. 
244 See Patricia E. Salkin, Effective Disaster Mitigation Depends Upon Well-Coordinated Land Use Planning and 
Zoning, 34 REAL EST. L.J. 108 (2005) (explaining that nonconformities to the local zoning code represent a 
significant exposure to casualty as a result of hazard events). 
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result, potentially slow a neighborhood’s recovery. If the nonconformity does not directly impair 
resilience to known hazards, then a community’s recovery may be best served by allowing these 
nonconforming properties to be modified or rebuilt without imposing additional legal 
obligations, such as additional public hearing requirements. 
Properties whose lots do not meet threshold requirements for lot size are, for example, 
considered nonconforming. In some jurisdictions, such as Hoboken, New Jersey, a majority of 
the city’s lots likely do not conform to zoning code requirements.245 A property lacking the 
minimum square footage for a lot in a particular zoning district must seek a variance for any 
modification of the nonconforming property, even if that modification is intended to help 
mitigate the impacts of future hazard events.246 But experiences from the Sandy long-term 
recovery suggest that not all nonconformities should be treated the same. If the proposed repair 
to, or modification of, a nonconforming property makes that property more resilient to future 
hazards, even if it remains nonconforming in some other way, there is a strong argument that the 
repair or modification should be encouraged to help facilitate community recovery and motivate 
owners to take steps to mitigate future loss. Local governments like Hoboken, faced with a long 
list of urgent post-disaster tasks, may take months or years to clarify whether and how 
homeowners seeking to repair or modify nonconforming properties may do so, thereby 
hampering both individual and community recovery.  
In the wake of a disaster, local government development offices are swamped with 
requests for review.247 If, before the hazard occurs, local governments can take steps to thin the 
ranks of potential applicants for zoning approvals by eliminating the requirement that 
nonconforming lot sizes obtain variances for any type of modifications, then the local 
government will have succeeded in streamlining the path to recovery for a family or business. 
Importantly, this efficiency can be achieved without ceding any important community goals for 
safety and disaster resilience. 
 
                                                 
245 See Davis, supra note 242 (reporting that as many as 55% of the city’s lots may not conform to Hoboken’s 
existing zoning code requirements). 
246 See id.  
247 See id. 
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3. Use restrictions: Obstacles to post-storm rehabilitation when compliance with federal 
flood insurance program requirements force homeowners to run afoul of use 
restrictions 
Local zoning codes, together with the local government’s map of its various zoning districts, 
give a zoning designation to every property within a particular jurisdiction.248 Some properties 
are designated commercial, others residential, and still others mixed use—just to name a few 
common designations. A zoning designation is critical because that designation dictates a 
parcel’s allowable uses.249 A property zoned “residential” must, for example, be used only for 
residential activities and generally cannot support any commercial uses as a principal use. A 
zoning district’s use designation also limits ancillary activities in which an owner can engage.250 
It is common, for instance, that residential zoning districts establish strict requirements for 
parking vehicles. 
Major disaster events can trigger exacting requirements for repairing and rebuilding 
structures. These requirements sometimes force individuals to rethink the fundamental design or 
layout of their homes or businesses. A critical consideration that homeowners and business 
owners face following flood- or storm surge-related disaster events is ensuring that the new or 
rehabilitated structure complies with FEMA requirements and thus can be insured at reasonable 
rates under the NFIP.251 Compliance with the NFIP may, however, create a hardship for building 
owners when federal regulations conflict with local zoning codes. For instance, in a 
neighborhood of attached row house buildings where elevation is difficult or impossible, owners 
may be forced to eliminate residential use below the DFE to make the building NFIP 
compliant.252 This leaves owners with three ways to recoup that lost floor area.  
The first option is to convert the area below the DFE to parking, which is allowed under 
NFIP regulations. However, in municipalities such as Hoboken, New Jersey, many zoning 
                                                 
248 See 2 N.Y. ZONING LAW & PRAC. §7:03.  
249 See JUERGENSMEYER ET AL., supra note 223, §4:2. 
250 See id. §§4:2, 4:4. 
251 See FEMA, FACTSHEET: REBUILDING SAFER, FASTER, STRONGER: CONSIDERATIONS FOR PROPERTY OWNERS, 
http://www.nj211.org/images/HurricaneSandy/RebuildingSafer.pdf. 
252 It is also possible that local governments may impose more exacting requirements that FEMA through their local 
codes. See FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, HOME BUILDERS GUIDE TO COASTAL CONSTRUCTION: 
REPAIRS, REMODELING, ADDITIONS AND RETROFITTING – FLOOD, available at  https://www.fema.gov/media-library-
data/20130726-1537-20490-6166/fema499_9_1.pdf 
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districts restrict ground-floor parking in order to create pedestrian-friendly active streetscapes, 
thus requiring a difficult-to-attain variance for parking uses.253 The second option is to convert 
the space to commercial use such as office or retail, which, unlike residential space, can be dry 
floodproofed. Again, though, many zoning codes strictly limit or completely bar retail or office 
use in residential neighborhoods.254 A final solution is to build an additional story on the top of 
the existing structure or to construct a rear yard addition. But, as discussed earlier in this section, 
such changes are only possible if the existing building has not already maximized the height 
limit or building envelope allowable under existing zoning. If none of these three options is 
possible, owners may be forced to choose between giving up a percentage of useable living space 
in order to comply with the NFIP or, if the building is not mortgaged, opting out of the NFIP and 
exposing themselves to future uninsured risks. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Developing effective disaster recovery programs—particularly federal programs with nationwide 
reach—will always be difficult in a large country like the United States, which presents a wide 
array of local contexts in which recovery policies must be applied.255 Consider that strong home-
rule power granted local governments could serve to frustrate the implementation of some state 
and federal policies. Consider also how jurisdictional borders that slice through metropolitan 
areas blunt effectual regional planning and coordination256 and allow state and local officials 
                                                 
253 The city of Hoboken restricts off-street parking in its R-1 residential zoning district. See HOBOKEN, N.J., 
MUNICIPAL CODE, ZONING §196-14(A)(1) (2018). However, the city amended the code to allow for “enclosed 
spaces below design flood elevation for a new or substantially improved building . . . only for vehicle parking. . . .” 
See id. §196-14(E)(6)(a)[4].  
254  See U.S. EPA, Essential Smart Growth Fixes For Urban and Suburban Zoning Codes 4 (Nov. 2009), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-01/documents/2009_essential_fixes_0.pdf. See generally Shelby D. 
Green, Zoning Neighborhoods for Resilience: Drivers, Tools and Impacts, 28 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 41, 78-79 
(2016) (explaining that Euclidean zoning has promoted strict segregation of uses and these divisions can run counter 
to neighborhood resilience interests). 
255 See Frug, supra note 146 (“[L]ike environmental systems, law is site-specific, so regional strategies can’t be 
addressed in sweepingly generalized legal principles. Instead, considerations must be tailored to the particularities of 
locations and conditions.”); Andrea McArdle, Lessons for New York: Comparative Urban Governance and the 
Challenge of Climate Change, 42 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 91, 101-02 (2016) 
256 Frug, supra note 146 (“Storms don’t respect jurisdictional boundaries, after all, and they likewise challenge us to 
coordinate disaster response on a regional scale.”). 
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from neighboring jurisdictions to chart sometimes divergent courses to recovery.257 Meaningful 
recovery from catastrophic disasters occurs only if it unfolds on the local level. Federal, state, 
and local governments must partner to ensure that disaster planning includes identifying potential 
local impediments to recovery and creating reasonable approaches to overcoming those barriers. 
More than five years removed from Superstorm Sandy, the affected region’s recovery 
continues to yield valuable lessons that can help officials in other places prepare for future 
catastrophic events. The Sandy recovery process has illustrated that, despite the many lessons 
learned since Hurricane Katrina and even as far back as the Portsmouth fire in 1802, recovery 
policy remains a challenge because no two disasters, even in the same location, will have the 
same impacts. As a result, whatever laws, regulations, and policies that exist at the time of one 
disaster will never fully address the exigencies associated with a subsequent event. But the 
Sandy long-term recovery also highlights that there are many recovery challenges that, even if 
flagged as problematic at one point in time, remain unresolved from disaster to disaster due to 
their political, legal, or logistical complexity. Therefore, it is instructive to analyze the Sandy 
region’s journey through long-term recovery to isolate valuable lessons that can help other 
communities affected by future disasters avoid some of the challenges that have slowed or 
stymied recovery efforts after Sandy.  
This Article highlights several of the legal levers that the region’s affected communities 
used to promote a quicker, more efficient, and more equitable long-term recovery by working 
within existing legal and policy constraints. It also underscores the legal obstacles that may have 
contributed to the New York and New Jersey region’s uneven recovery. We examine these 
failures because they may aid other disaster-impacted regions to make better decisions about 
long-term recovery, including communities dealing with more recent disasters in Florida, Puerto 
Rico, and Texas. We are mindful that these pitfalls can become levers for positive change only if 
local governments address legal problems and deficiencies well in advance of potential hazard 
events. And, we note that this Article inevitably leaves some challenges unexamined, such as the 
lack of federal recovery support for undocumented families or the sometimes onerous 
complexity of paperwork that creates hardships for residents who do not speak English or have 
limited time to deal with complex and time-consuming application processes. 
                                                 
257 See Donovan Finn et al., Planning for Resilience in the New York Metro Region After Superstorm Sandy, in 
SPATIAL PLANNING AND RESILIENCE FOLLOWING DISASTERS: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 
117-35 (Stefan Greiving et al. eds., Policy Press 2016). 
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There are many lessons to be learned from Sandy and many legal and policy implications 
of these lessons. This concluding section provides six brief practical recommendations designed 
to help local officials think about how they can prepare to address long-term recovery challenges 
in their own jurisdictions well before the need arises. 
Lesson 1: Advocate for amending existing federal disaster recovery policies to provide 
for greater flexibility in state and local implementation. At the federal level, perhaps the most 
important lesson from Sandy is that recovery programs need to be more flexible, especially 
FEMA programs including the NFIP, which have not always translated well to the Sandy 
region’s specific physical landscape and the economic challenges faced by many residents. In 
parts of the country where mismatch between federal policy and local realities may be 
anticipated, state and local governments can work through their congressional representatives to 
address these kinds of issues. New York City officials, in particular, have been vocal advocates 
for modifying federal recovery rules to be more flexible regarding contextual issues like those 
outlined here. However, it is important to understand that flexibility comes at a price. Given the 
federal government’s fear of graft and misuse of recovery funds as well as the political and 
philosophical skirmishes over the appropriate federal role in disaster recovery, these challenges 
are likely to persist. 
Lesson 2: Spend the time and resources to develop internal recovery capacity. While the 
federal government is the primary funder of disaster recovery aid, it only administers some of the 
many recovery programs that communities and constituents will need to access after a 
devastating disaster. State governments must shoulder a significant burden designing programs 
and administering CDBG-DR funds while local governments will likely need to provide 
technical assistance to affected residents attempting to navigate the complexities of FEMA, SBA 
programs, and the way those programs interface with local ordinances. Further, local 
governments will need to work with other federal agencies that may have purview over various 
aspects of the overall recovery process, such as the U.S. Department of Transportation, the 
Corps, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, and many others.  
While many communities have designated and standing emergency management staff, 
their responsibilities and energies typically focus on short-term emergency response, and their 
expertise in long-term recovery may be more limited. State and local officials including elected 
representatives, city planners, legal departments, and those with responsibilities for community 
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development, economic development, housing, education, public works, transportation, and 
other sectors should also develop familiarity with federal recovery programs pertinent to their 
area of expertise. Having a working knowledge of federal recovery programs, and having that 
expertise spread across multiple agencies, will help state and local governments move more 
rapidly and effectively into recovery mode should the need arise. 
Lesson 3: Identify potential vulnerabilities or unique attributes of the local landscape. As 
important as it is for state and local governments to develop their own internal recovery capacity 
by educating themselves about federal recovery programs, states and municipalities should also 
think carefully about how well these existing programs will work in their own specific local 
contexts. Many of the lessons learned from Sandy about the implications of local conditions are 
enumerated above, such as the significant percentage of New York City residents living in 
cooperatives and condominiums who were not served well by NFIP restrictions, or the 
challenges of elevating attached buildings to conform with NFIP requirements. But other 
localities have their own potential challenges that can be identified through careful pre-event 
analysis. New Orleans had a pre-Katrina poverty rate of 26%, and a high number of homeowners 
who could not establish legal title to their residence. In Puerto Rico, similar issues are now 
emerging in the recovery from Hurricane Maria. Other potential issues may be pertinent in other 
places. Whether it is the percentage of elderly or undocumented residents or unique land 
development patterns, each of these facts creates obstacles to recovery that can, at least to some 
degree, be anticipated in advance and dealt with.  
Lesson 4: Evaluate local code requirements to flag potential legal obstacles to recovery. 
As its name suggests, long-term recovery unfolds over an extended time horizon. But once the 
decision to rebuild is made, local governments can, at a minimum, take steps to ensure that 
processes and procedures are in place to facilitate recovery. A local government, for instance, 
cannot necessarily expect to commit resources to evaluating and revising its local zoning code in 
the wake of a disaster. New York City did so after Sandy, but it required a significant 
expenditure of resources and took almost a year to put permanent changes in place. Hoboken and 
Long Beach also eventually modified their zoning codes to facilitate more resilient rebuilding 
and conformity with NFIP requirements, but it took time. Immediately following a disaster, 
however, it would be more desirable if local governments and elected officials could focus on the 
actual rebuilding process as opposed to removing internal legal barriers.  
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For communities that would hope to avoid the kinds of self-imposed legal barriers to 
effective recovery outlined here, such flawed legal infrastructure can be hard to detect. Existing 
laws that seem beneficial in “blue sky” situations may only emerge as barriers to effective 
recovery when issues like speed, flexibility, and efficiency become critically important, such as 
when dozens or hundreds of desperate property owners hoping to start rebuilding after a disaster 
overwhelm local site plan review or variance processes. The time to identify and remove these 
types of local law-related impediments to recovery and community resilience is before disaster 
strikes. Local governments should begin work as soon as feasible to upgrade local laws and 
regulations to make it easier, or mandatory, or even just possible, for residents to build more 
resilient buildings today as well as rebuild more resiliently after a disaster.  
Lesson 5: Be prepared to develop state and local programs to fill gaps: States and local 
governments should also understand that, no matter how much they lobby for federal 
programmatic changes, there will inevitably be issues that federal programs are unable to 
address. Developing local knowledge about the structure and limitations of federal programs and 
understanding local barriers to recovery can help communities quickly pivot to a recovery stance. 
But local officials are also advised to expend efforts now to, at minimum, think about how they 
might address some of the known challenges from other disasters through their own state or local 
programs. For instance, New York City, New York state, and New Jersey developed housing 
programs specifically to assist residents of cooperatives, mobile homes, and other types of 
housing poorly served by federal programs. While some of these approaches might be funded by 
CDBG-DR, allocations may not be sufficient to address all needs. Federal regulations may also 
limit how funds can be spent. Local governments may also need to provide cash grants or other 
publicly funded solutions such as permit waivers, tax abatements, or free technical assistance if 
they wish to ensure effective resident and business recovery.  
 Lesson 6: Advocate for coordinated action among local governments. If a code 
deficiency is limited to a single jurisdiction, the local government can, of course, act on its own. 
But what if the code problem is more widespread? The post-Sandy recovery period shows how 
multiple jurisdictions in the region encountered similar kinds of code-related problems that 
caused unnecessary post-disaster redevelopment delays. The reality of shared zoning code 
deficiencies suggests the value of considering potential strategies to help groups of local 
governments amend their zoning codes in a fair and efficient manner—and to do so before 
PRE-PUBLICATION DRAFT: Please cite from published version 
 
  
disaster strikes. Disasters such as Sandy affect multiple cities and towns across one or more 
states. Thus, it is important to consider how local governments can act in concert so that a 
metropolitan region’s recovery is not uneven. A metropolitan region has a better chance to 
recover if its member communities share a commitment to setting long-term recovery strategies 
and goals. Without such cooperation, it is possible that recovery will lag in communities that 
lacked the resources or initiative to improve their zoning laws. Federal, state, nonprofit, and for-
profit stakeholders should be invited to participate and provide technical assistance. 
Long-term recovery is uneven and unfolds slowly, or, as global disaster recovery scholars 
Laurie A. Johnson and Robert B. Olshansky bluntly state in their most recent book, “It is never 
easy, and it is never fast enough for affected residents.”258 Local and state governments play an 
essential role in facilitating recovery or at least a sense of a sustainable “new normal.” By 
working with federal and nongovernmental partners to anticipate and remove legal barriers to 
homeowner and business recovery, local and state governments can help to ensure that disaster 
recovery does not become a “two-tier” process where some members of a community rebound 
quickly while others struggle to return or rebuild. Cities, counties, towns, and states must come 
together prior to a disaster to study, identify, and address community vulnerabilities of all kinds, 
including legal barriers and vulnerabilities. In so doing, they are taking essential steps toward 
ensuring that no individual, family, or business becomes mired in regulatory footfalls and, as a 
consequence, is left worse off than before the disaster.  
                                                 
258 LAURIE A. JOHNSON & ROBERT B. OLSHANSKY, AFTER GREAT DISASTERS: AN IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS OF HOW SIX 
COUNTRIES MANAGED COMMUNITY RECOVERY 309 (2017). 
